## AT EP Solvency

Environmental protection laws in developing countries don’t solve environmental harms. Multiple warrants.

**EcoVitality 99** writes[[1]](#footnote-1)

INADEQUATE ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES: Even the most enthusiastic and naive proponent of IEL should realize that **environmental protection is** a **complicated and costly** undertaking that must be maintained, revised, and renewed on a continuing basis. The **developing nations lack** the **requisite scientific knowledge,** managerial expertise, trained **personnel,** financial resources**, institutional frameworks**, political commitments, **and popular support** necessary **to implement effective environmental protection** programs on a wide scale. Legal pronouncements, no matter how sweeping and unambiguous, cannot serve as substitutes for these indispensable administrative requirements. Despite various "capacity building" programs initiated by the governments of developed nations and a variety of U.N. agencies and multilateral organizations, few if any poor states have acquired the technical, managerial, and financial capabilities to implement conservation measures on a broad front. Absent these capacities, ecological conservation cannot succeed no matter how sincerely the government and people of a nation may want to preserve their natural heritage. INADEQUATE POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND POPULAR SUPPORT: **The** overwhelming **priority** of governments and entrepreneurs **in virtually every poor nation is to increase** economic growth and **development opportunities**. And **the** great **majority** of "common" citizens **are** so **caught up in day-to-day subsistence** activities that their priorities are also overwhelmingly economic. Given these priorities, **it is** a **very rare** occurrence indeed **when a**ny **development project is** stopped or **hindered by conflicts with** international and national **environmental laws**. In many countries, **most people damaging natural systems** or features **are not aware of** any **applicable conservation laws and would not consider them personally relevant** if they did know the laws. **Few if any governments in developing countries have a systematic plan for monitoring compliance** with their environmental laws or for enforcing the laws in the likely event of non-compliance. Even where widespread practices are known to be environmentally destructive and socially disadvantageous for most citizens, as in the contexts of cyanide and dynamite fishing, slash-and-burn deforestation, or toxic water pollution, governments in developing states very seldom interfere with flagrant violations of their environmental laws.

## AT Dependency Theory (Neolib Aff)

Dependency theory fails. **Reid-Henry 12** gives multiple warrants[[2]](#footnote-2)

But do the insights of dependency theorists still hold water? **The** somewhat **pessimistic implication of the dependency approach is** to assume **that poor countries can only improve** their condition **by de-linking from the world economy.** And as Frank himself was later to acknowledge, **that makes it** very **hard to develop at all.** Moreover, **it has been** largely **disproved by** the experience of the **east Asian tiger economies**: something other dependency scholars, such as the Brazilian intellectual and later president Fernando Henrique Cardoso, recognised at the time. But, above all, **dependency theory could never** really **account for the** sheer **variety of experiences that poor countries** around the world **exhibit. In its hardline form,** then, **dependency theory is** of perhaps **limited** value today, which reiterates a lesson learned from modernisation: that **when theories become all encompassing, they** tend to **become** ever further **removed from useful policy advice.**

## AT Blood Diamonds Aff

“Blood diamonds” are media hype and unnecessarily take away from revenue of African miners.

**Wenzel 10** writes[[3]](#footnote-3)

Rough-diamond consultant, Jack Jolis, has an informative op-ed piece at WSJ on the absurd goings on in The Hague. Here are some snippets. Thanks to Naomi Campbell's clueless testimony before the U.N. Special Court for Sierra Leone in The Hague, the manufactured nonscandal of "blood diamonds" is once again being trundled before the collective gullibility of the world. The hoopla is over some diamonds that allegedly were given during a gala fund-raiser hosted by the sainted Nelson Mandela to Ms. Campbell by Charles Taylor, the apparently infatuated accused mass murderer and ex-president of Liberia (and erstwhile friend of Americans such as Jesse Jackson and Jimmy Carter). But **despite what** much **media coverage would have you believe,** the parallel occurrences of **diamonds and** internecine **mayhem in Africa are in no way related**—**certainly no more than** are violence and **any other** commercial **commodity** found on the continent. **When was the last time we heard of** "blood manganese," or **"blood copper," or**, for that matter, **"**blood **bananas"** or "blood cut flowers"**?**. The fact is that **most African diamonds are produced in places** that are **reasonably**-to-perfectly **peaceful (such as Botswana, Namibia and South Africa), whereas** there are **murderous African conflicts** that **rage elsewhere without** the slightest **"assistance" from diamonds (such as Rwanda, Uganda and the Sudan)**. Alas, this simple truth is no match for the combined forces of liberal guilt and the commercial interests of a few players in the diamond industry. So the "blood diamond" charade has marched on unimpeded, passing through Congress (where I testified about the absurdity of the whole notion 10 years ago), through Hollywood in the hands of Leonardo DiCaprio (in "Blood Diamond"), and most recently last week with a supermodel's testimony in The Hague about her "dirty pebbles." **In this faux-morality play, everyone has a**n assigned **role:** •**Cover-seeking panjandrums of the diamond industry—egged on by** the **canny PR spinners at DeBeers. The latter's** main **interest is** in **eliminating independent diamond production**. But the campaign against "blood diamonds" is eagerly latched onto by many others in the industry who see any intergovernmental anti-"blood diamond" scheme, no matter how unworkable or feckless, as an opportunity to reap respectability and goodwill. • Cynical NGO charlatans who know a good racket when they've stumbled on one, and who know that emotive images of amputees and child soldiers, when pictured (no matter how incongruously or unjustifiably) beside diamond-bedecked Naomi Campbell types, will prove irresistible to the unknowing public. • Venal politicians on every continent, who will leap onto any bandwagon that provides a vehicle for cheap moral preening..... ....diamonds have no legally dispositive geographical DNA. As I believe they say on 47th Street, "fuggeddabahdit." **To the extent that** this **intercontinental tail-chasing** of a "Kimberley Process" **results in anything at all** (other than the moral salving of the consciences of the world's bien-pensants), **it is to diminish** the **desperately needed revenue of** those who are most courageous and blameless in the entire diamond pipeline—i.e., the independent, **artisanal local diggers in Africa** (and to a lesser extent, in South America). If the campaigns of groups like Global Witness result in any fewer sales of diamonds from Sierra Leone, Liberia or the Congo, it will not diminish the income of Harry Winston or Cartier or Bulgari, nor of Africa's "Big Men," whether in presidential palaces or rebel redoubts. The only loser would be the poor devil in torn shorts and flip-flops on a muddy riverbed with a shovel and a wheelbarrow, who, if he knew what was being done supposedly in his name, would not be grateful in the slightest.

## AT Environmental Racism

Separating minorities from industrial sites causes poverty which turns health.

**Friedman 98** writes[[4]](#footnote-4)

**Of greatest concern is** the **likelihood the guidance will dramatically increase** already-crippling **regulatory uncertainties** in urban areas where ethnic populations predominate. Rather than risk endless delay and EPA-brokered activist shakedowns, **businesses will** tacitly **"redline" minority communities and shift operations to white**, politically conservative, **less-developed locations**. Stunningly, this possibility doesn't bother the EPA and its environmentalist allies. "I've heard senior agency officials just dismiss the possibility that their policies might adversely affect urban development," says lawyer Hernandez. Dinsell, a champion of Michigan's industrial revival, was stunned when Ann Goode, the EPA's civil rights director, said her agency never considered the guidance's adverse economic and social effects. "As director of the Office of Civil Rights" she lectured House lawmakers, "local economic development is not something I can help with." Perhaps it should be. Since 1980, the economies of America's major urban regions, including Cleveland, Chicago, Milwaukee, Detroit, Pittsburgh, New Orleans, San Francisco, Newark, Los Angeles, New York City, Baltimore, and Philadelphia, grew at only one-third the rate of the overall American economy. As the economies of the nation's older cities slumped, 11 million new jobs were created in whiter areas. **Pushing away good industrial jobs hurts** the pocketbook of **urban minorities**, **and**, ironically, **harms their health in the process**. In a 1991 Health Physics article, University of Pittsburgh physicist Bernard L. **Cohen extensively analyzed mortality** data **and found that while** hazardous **waste and** air **pollution** exposure **takes** from **three to 40 days off a life-span, poverty reduces** a person's **life expectancy by** an average of **10 years**. Separating minorities from industrial plants is thus not only bad economics, but bad health and welfare policy as well.

Environmental racism is empirically denied and aff studies aren’t peer-reviewed.

**Friedman 98** writes[[5]](#footnote-5)

A year later, the GAO said that they were. Superfund and similar toxic dumps, it appeared, were disproportionately located in non-white neighborhoods. The well-heeled, overwhelmingly white environmentalist lobby christened this alleged phenomenon "environmental racism," and ethnic advocates like Ben Chavis and Robert Bullard built a grievance over the next decade. **Few** of the **relevant studies were peer-reviewed; all made critical errors**. Properly analyzed, the **data revealed that waste sites are just as likely** to be **located in white neighborhoods, or** in areas **where minorities moved** only **after permits were granted**. Despite sensational charges of racial "genocide" in industrial districts and ghastly "cancer alleys," **health data don't show minorities being poisoned by toxic sites**. "Though activists have a hard time accepting it," notes Brookings fellow Christopher H. Foreman, Jr., a self-described black liberal Democrat, "racism simply doesn't appear to be a significant factor in our national environmental decision-making."

No environmental racism. Aff impacts are inevitable.

**Little 7** writes[[6]](#footnote-6)

Some critics of the environmental-justice movement go further. **It is not surprising**, they say, **that land near toxic sites is inexpensive and that** the **people** who live **there are poor. “It’s neither possible nor desirable in a free society to have all groups living equally close to everything** — be it libraries or landfills,” argues Michael Steinberg, a Washington lawyer with clients in the chemical industry. “**Even the old Soviet Politburo would have a hard time pulling that one off**.” The **mere fact of disparate impact**, he says, **is not evidence of intentional discrimination** in the placement of polluting facilities **— it’s just economics.**

## AT Free Trade Bad Aff

Environmental protection laws strengthen free trade agreements. Developing countries will pass them to get an advantage in trade.

**EcoVitality 99** writes[[7]](#footnote-7)

**Developing nations may** also **need to** ratify IEL agreements and **enact environmental laws as a precondition for obtaining trade advantages offered by wealthy countries influenced by environmental concerns**. An example of this inducement is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), in which the primary motivation of all three nations was to increase trade and economic growth. However, **environmentalists** in the U.S. and Canada **threatened to derail NAFTA** negotiations **unless Mexico upgraded** its **environmental protection** laws. In response, **Mexico did adopt strong** pollution control and **conservation laws on paper, but legal implementation has been** predictably erratic if not wholly **illusory.** **Adoption of** IEL treaties and national **conservation laws may defuse** adverse publicity and **controversy that could deter potential investments** and tourism in the state. For example, environmentalists have often publicized the high deforestation rate in the Malaysian State of Sarawak on Borneo, which conflicts with the Sarawak government's attempt to attract tourism by emphasizing that it still possesses among the largest and most pristine rainforest areas in the world. Whether a government wants favorable treatment from other governments, multilateral organizations, or private parties, the adoption of paper laws offers a visible indication that the environmental objectives of the other actors are being taken seriously. Environmental lawmaking may help deflect internal political criticisms as well as external pressures from the international community. Lawmaking without major investments in implementation and compliance may, from a government's perspective, defuse media scrutiny and public aspirations for environmental protection in a way that does not jeopardize economic development. In this sense, the creation of illusory conservation obligations may function as a high-pressure steam relief valve on a boiler, mollifying environmentalists without the need to impose severe regulatory burdens on entrepreneurial activities. In short, governments may achieve "the best of both worlds" from a political perspective by enacting strict conservation laws to placate environmentalists but then not implementing or enforcing those laws to reduce administrative costs and to accommodate pressures from business interests. The point to keep in mind is that **governments in developing states may** derive a range of **benefit**s **from** adoption of **conservation laws that have little connection with** the **ecological** and social **benefits** from genuine environmental protection. And most other governments almost never make serious attempts to h these states to their self-assumed legal obligations.

[Don’t read both.]

Free trade agreements and TNCs are key to the environment.

**Smith 2k** writes[[8]](#footnote-8)

**Trade agreements**, often blamed for increasing the risk of environmental damage to health, **can have positive effects. In implementing** the North American Free Trade Agreement (**NAFTA**), for example, **Mexico had to upgrade its food and drug regulations** substantially, **with** considerable **health benefits to the Mexican population**. Moreover, **trade rules relating to pesticide** and bacterial **contamination in exports can** lead to **increase**d **protection** for populations in both developing and industrialized countries. **There is also evidence that**, in general, **t**rans**n**ational **c**orporation**s** tend to **maintain higher environmental** and occupational **standards** in their host countries **than** do **local companies.**

## AT MEA Solvency Mech

International environmental laws get modeled by developing countries in a way that can’t solve the environment.

**EcoVitality 99** writes[[9]](#footnote-9)

Despite differences in international and national lawmaking processes, no clear boundary demarcates where International Environmental Law leaves off and national law begins. In many instances, **national environmental laws have been enacted for the sole purpose of meeting** obligations imposed by **international agreements**. Conversely, IEL agreements have often been modeled after domestic environmental laws of developed states: One example is the widespread adoption of environmental impact assessment requirements first imposed by the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act of 1970 (NEPA). In developing states, many conservation and sustainable development legal mandates stem from requirements imposed by foreign aid programs, international development banks, U.N. agencies, or other multilateral organizations as prerequisites for grants, loans, technology transfers, or various alternative forms of economic assistance. **To appear responsible** members of the "community of nations," **developing nations** frequently **enact "model" legislation copying environmental laws drafted by developed states, even if these** archetypal **laws have little relevance to** the **ecological** and social **circumstances of** the **Third World states** adopting them. In order to participate in international conferences on environmental issues that may affect their national interests, developing states may have to demonstrate the appropriate awareness and concern through the ratification of environmental treaties and enactment of a paper framework of domestic environmental laws. Considering these practices and incentives in the aggregate, we suspect that **most developing states would have very little environmental law** of any kind **if not for** explicit or implicit **pressures exerted by** the developed nations and **multilateral institutions**.

## AT Resource Wars

TURN – Resource extraction solves instability and conflict. **Bodea 12** writes[[10]](#footnote-10)

On the other hand, however, natural **resources** do **bring in** more cash to governments and the **revenues** can be **used to strengthen weak governments. Smith** (2004) **and Morrison** (2009), for example, **show that oil exports** and, respectively, oil rents **increase** political **regime durability of** both **democracies and dictatorships** rather than promote instability (see also Ulfelder 2007, Omgba 2009). Also, as Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) argue, leaders in small-coalition systems rely on private goods, rather than public goods, to reward their key supporters. The presence of natural **resource rents**, especially in important quantities, in countries governed by small elites **can** both provide resources for funding private goods and **motivate leaders to keep** those **resources under** the **control of the state, by focusing the effort of the security apparatus**. Further, Smith (2008), shows that free resources (like oil or diamonds) allow small coalition systems to (further) reduce the provision of public goods in response to revolutionary threats, increasing the coordination costs of revolutions and reducing economic growth.3 Free resources, however, help leaders maintain rent distribution to the inner elite circle despite the contraction of the economy. More directly related to civil conflict, **Basedau and Lay** (2009) **and Fjelde** (2009) **suggest that** **abundant resources** may be **used** by the government **to buy off opposition, increase** the **support of loyal factions and would be rebels or step up** the **financing of** the **security** apparatus, all of which are argued to **reduce** the **vulnerability** of countries **to** the onset **civil war**. Specifically, Basedau and Lay (2009) find that oil wealth (when controlling for dependence on oil revenue) reduces the chances for civil war onset. Their work on a smaller sample of countries with high average dependence on oil revenues shows that, **comparatively**, the **countries rich in oil** vs. the poorer ones can **maintain peace because they engage in more large scale distribution and spend more on** the **military**.4 Fjelde (2010) finds that, **when corruption is present, oil wealth** (quantity and rents) **increases** the chances for **peace**. She interprets the findings to be a consequence of natural resources facilitating the provision of private goods to would be rebel factions or to the potential followers of entrepreneurs of political violence (see also LeBillon 2003

RE doesn’t make civil wars inevitable.

**Ross 3** writes[[11]](#footnote-11)

Second, natural **resource dependence never makes conflict inevitable**. Resource wealth raises the danger of civil war, but **for every resource-rich country that has suffered from violent conflict, two or three have avoided it. Civil wars are still rare** events**. Outside of Africa, they are** also **getting rarer.**

Multiple methodological issues with aff studies.

**Gunes 12** writes[[12]](#footnote-12)

With regards to above mentioned theory, how do we go about evaluating its usefulness in the context of the real world? Is it enough that these theories make sense on a theoretical level? Or do we need to look further into the empirics? As the theories of Collier and Hoeffler are very much empirically anchored, the “validity” of their theory making will ultimately unravel in an investigation into their definition, coding, and correlation considerations. Three methodological concerns are therefore raised in order to conceptualize on the evidence presented by Collier and Hoeffler: Firstly, a principal concern is tied to the definition of civil war. **What constitutes** violence, let alone **civil war?** And how does one go about defining civil war in such a way as to be able to measure its existence? The definition used by Collier and Hoeffler depicts civil war as: “An internal conflict with at least 1,000 combat-related deaths, with both an identifiable rebel organization and government forces suffering at least five percent of these casualties.” There are several concerns related to the use of battle-related deaths as an indicator of civil war. For one, it can be a misleading indicator of civil war because **many current conflicts are not heavily combat oriented**, instead more than 90 percent of casualties are civilian. Moreover, the operational definition of 1000 battle-related deaths also obscures the difference in population size and in effect favors countries with larger populations. A country with a larger population will in absolute terms suffer greater then a smaller country with the same percentage of causalities, and herein lays a significant inaccuracy in measurement of impact. Secondly, **the relationship between** the ethos of **large-scale violence and war is** rather **ambiguously and arbitrary** operationally defined **in the lit**erature. Collier and Hoeffler’s threshold is of 1000 battle-related deaths. While others propose 25 battle-related deaths a year to better capture the range in war (for instance eco-violence). To further extend the strain of thought one could even argue that a battle-related death (hot war) is not the sole criteria and measure of civil war. Using the wisdom of Thomas Hobbes, state weakness could just as well be an initiating source of violence, as war exists “not only in battle or in the act of fighting, but in a tract of time wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently know”. Henceforth the wider **definition of civil war is open to a wide array of** (**philosophical**) **interpretations**. Third, **correlation does not necessary equal causality. It might well be that**, for instance a high threshold for civil war, like the one posited by Collier and Hoeffler, **only detect a correlation with mineral abundance because in the time it takes** for **a conflict to grow into a civil war most** other **industries have “fled the country”**.And as Collier and Hoeffler only recognize the initiation of civil war when at least 1000 battle-related deaths have occurred, they in effect ignore the role of preceding violence before the 1000 threshold is reached. Moreover **also neglecting** the **possibility of “reverse causality”,** were large-scale violence and **civil war might** in fact **be the initiator of mineral and fuel dependence** and not the other way around. Fourth, different datasets pave the way for different interpretations. **Recent studies draw mainly on four datasets** for civil war: Collier and Hoeffler, Fearon and Laitin, Elbadawi and Sambanis, and Gleditsch and his associates, all of which branch out from the Uppsala dataset. **The** aforementioned **datasets differ in their approach to**: 1) **defining** the **occurrence of civil war**; 2) **its end**; **and** 3) **in handling missing data**. With regards to coding civil war onset Collier and Hoeffler detect 78, while Fearon and Laitin detect 97 civil wars. Furthermore other scholars such as Gleditsch et al. observe in total 111 civil wars in their dataset. These variations point to the ambiguous nature of defining civil war. Conclusion The initial dive into the world of “greed and grievance” has given some theoretical weight to conceptualizations on the assumed link between mineral and oil abundance, and civil war. What it has not done however is to give clarity. The civil war literature is indeed a tangled pot of theory and evidence. What we can extract from the literature is the distinction made between greed and grievance in motivating civil war. What is rather harder to do is to draw a clear-cut conclusion on the role of mineral and oil in initiating civil war and large-scale violence. Despite presenting theory positive to the “civil war link”, the end conclusion is not of confirmation, but of ambiguousness. This is mainly due to methodological challenges. Still the ambiguity of the literature seems, rather rightly, to reflect the complexity of the phenomena at hand.

## Enviro Collapse Defense

### Resilient

The environment is resilient. **Easterbrook 95** writes[[13]](#footnote-13)

IN THE AFTERMATH OF EVENTS SUCH AS LOVE CANAL OR THE Exxon Valdez oil spill, every reference to the environment is prefaced with the adjective "fragile." "Fragile environment" has become a welded phrase of the modern lexicon, like "aging hippie" or "fugitive financier." But the notion of a fragile environment is profoundly wrong. Individual animals, plants, and people are distressingly fragile. **The environment** that contains them **is** close to **indestructible.** The living environment of **Earth has survived ice ages;** bombardments of cosmic **radiation more deadly than atomic fallout**; solar radiation **more powerful than** the worst-case projection for **ozone depletion;** thousand-year periods of intense volcanism releasing global air **pollution far worse than** that made by **any factory**; **reversals of** the planet's magnetic **poles;** the **rearrangement of continents**; transformation of plains into mountain ranges and of seas into plains; fluctuations of ocean currents and the jet stream; **300-foot** vacillations in **sea levels**; shortening and lengthening of the seasons caused by shifts in the planetary axis; collisions of **asteroids** and comets **bearing far more force than** man's **nuclear arsenals**; and the years without summer that followed these impacts. Yet hearts beat on, and petals unfold still. Were the environment fragile it would have expired many eons before the advent of the industrial affronts of the dreaming ape. **Human assaults** on the environment, though mischievous, **are pinpricks** compared to forces of the magnitude nature is accustomed to resisting.

### Inevitable

Environmental destruction is inevitable.

**Lazarus 10** writes[[14]](#footnote-14)

Some **environmental pollution is**, of course, **unavoidable**. Basic human **life requires** the **consumption** of the surrounding natural environment. While the First Law of Thermodynamics provides for the conservation of energy (and classical physics for the conservation Of mass),16 **the Second Law provides** for **the inevitable increases in entropy** that result from human activity. The term "entropy" refers to the degree of disorder in a system. For instance, as energy is transformed from one form to another, some energy is lost as heat; as the energy decreases, the disorder in the system, and hence the entropy, increases. IS Natural **resource destruction** and environmental contamination **is a form of entropy**. Disorder in the ecosystem is increased when common resources such as air and water are polluted. Disorder is likewise increased whenever complex natural resources are broken down into smaller parts. **In consuming** natural resources **to provide** the **basic necessities** of energy, food, shelter, and clothing, **humankind** necessarily **increases entropy** in parts of the ecosystem **in the form of polluted** global **resources** and destroyed natural resources. Fundamental human biological processes compel it. Human life depends, as life does in many animals, on a series of chemical reactions within the cells of the human body capable of breaking down complex chemical compounds such as glucose into its component parts of carbon dioxide and water.19 The technical name of the necessary biochemical process for the breakdown of glucose is carbohydrate catabolism, which itself consists of three major stages: glycosis, citric acid cycle (known as the "Krebs cycle") and phosphorylation.20 For the purposes of this essay, however, what is important for the nonscientific reader to understand is how these many biochemical processes ultimately depend on the breaking down of more complex and ordered chemical compounds into less complex and more disordered chemical elements. Some natural resource destruction and environmental pollution are necessarily implicated by such processes. As energy is transformed from one form to another, natural resources are consumed and contamination of existing natural resources results. To the extent, moreover, that it is human nature to seek to survive, it is human nature to undertake activities that cause such natural resource destruction and environmental pollution. That central threshold proposition should be noncontroversial. **What is** no doubt more **controversial is whether it is** similarly **human nature to consume the** natural **environment in a nonsustainable fashion.** Garrett **Hardin's** classic **article** "The Tragedy of the Commons," published in Science in 1968,21 **offers a** disturbing **answer** to that question. Although Hardin's central thesis is well-known, it is worth emphasis here by repetition: The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day when the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy. As a rational being, **each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain.** Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, "What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?" . .. **[T]he rational herdsman concludes** that the **only sensible course for** him **[them] to pursue is to add another animal** to his herd. **And another**. .. But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit-in a world that is limited. **Ruin is the destination toward which all** men **[people] rush**, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.22 Hardin describes his thesis in the limited context of human nature faced with a pasture for animal grazing, but it all too easily extends with potentially catastrophic results to many contemporary environmental settings. The expansive reach of modern technology has turned the once seemingly infinite into the finite. Populations of ocean fisheries can be irreversibly destroyed. Underground aquifers of drinking water supplies can be forever lost. And, of course, potentially destructive global climate change may occur from increased loadings of carbon to the atmosphere from anywhere in the globe. Modern technology also has its limits, as the nation was tragically reminded in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina this past year. Modern technology allowed for the development of a major metropolitan area where nature, standing alone, would have precluded any such possibility. New Orleans was largely below sea level and existed only by grace of a complex series of levees designed to keep water from flowing along its natural course. Even when properly constructed, such levees are no match, however, for the enormous force of hurricanes like Katrina, especially when thousands of acres of surrounding wetlands, which might have otherwise provided some natural protection from flood waters, are filled to satisfy ever-rising demands for residential, commercial, and industrial development. The upshot: the devastation of a city, the loss of human life, and the destruction of an invaluable aquatic ecosystem by floodwaters laden with toxic contaminants.23 Hardin's central insight regarding the implications of human nature for the natural environment extends much further, however, than to just the potential tragic destruction of resource commons. Each of the individual actors in Hardin's proffered tragedy cause ruin to all because of their inability to look beyond the here and now. They perceive well their own, present short-term needs. **They are unable to apprehend and take into account the longerterm implications for** individual **persons at other times** or in other places. Even if presented by information detailing those broader spatial and temporal impacts, they would be unable on their own to temper their own immediate actions as necessary to avoid the resource common's tragic destruction. The risks facing New Orleans have been well-known for decades. Yet, short-term needs always trumped government's willingness and ability to expend the massive resources necessary to guard against long-term, low-risk events, even if of potentially catastrophic consequences.z4 More recent research into behavioral psychology and human cognitive biases offers contemporary confirmation of Hardin's basic thesis. Experimental research shows that humans strongly favor avoidance of immediate costs over less immediate, longerterm, and distant risks. Dubbed by some a "myopia" bias, scientists argue that a strong basic desire to avoid immediate costs is present throughout nature and is deeply rooted in evolutionary biology.25 Others similarly argue that human genetic evolution has systematically favored consumerism and materialism, i.e., the so-called "selfish gene. "26 When, over thousands of years ago, human beings relied on hunting and gathering to get their next meal, long-term planning was of little value. After all, without a means of preserving food, there was little reason to plan. It was better to consume what one found when one found it, especially when there was no assurance that more would be found tomorrow. "Our brains were built for a world in which the currency of the day did lose value over time. Put simply: food rotS."27 "[N]ature created within us a short-sighted set of moral instincts."28 Selfish shortsightedness and materialism became dominant tendencies in the competition with other species for survival. "Rather than leave some precious energy lying around to mold or be stolen, put it in your stomach and have your body convert the food into an energy savings account. "29 The drive for survival arguably extended to the production of heirs-survival by the passing of genes to one's children-and the accumulation of material wealth often seen as a necessary prerequisite for successful reproduction. 3D And, "even though wealth may not relate to babies in an industrialized world, our instincts come from a time when concerns over material possessions were crucial."31 One commentator has gone so far as to suggest, provocatively, that "[h]uman failings, such as those that some call the Seven Deadly Sins, may all derive from our evolutionary traps. "32

### AT Extinction

1. No extinction. **Easterbrook 03**[[15]](#footnote-15)

**If we're talking about doomsday - the end of human civilization - many scenarios simply don't measure up**. A single nuclear bomb ignited by terrorists, for example, would be awful beyond words, but life would go on. People and machines might converge in ways that you and I would find ghastly, but from the standpoint of the future, they would probably represent an adaptation. **Environmental collapse might make parts of the globe unpleasant, but considering that the biosphere has survived ice ages, it wouldn't be the final curtain**. Depression, which has become 10 times more prevalent in Western nations in the postwar era, might grow so widespread that vast numbers of people would refuse to get out of bed, a possibility that Petranek suggested in a doomsday talk at the Technology Entertainment Design conference in 2002. But Marcel Proust, as miserable as he was, wrote Remembrance of Things Past while lying in bed.

2. No extinction. Tech has decoupled humanity from the environment

**Science Daily 10** writes[[16]](#footnote-16)

Global degradation of ecosystems is widely believed to threaten human welfare, yet **accepted measures of well-being show** that **it is** on average **improving globally**, both **in poor countries and rich** ones. A team of authors writing in the September issue of BioScience dissects explanations for this "environmentalist's paradox." Noting that understanding the paradox is "critical to guiding future management of ecosystem services," Ciara Raudsepp-Hearne and her colleagues confirm that improvements in aggregate well-being are real, **despite** convincing **evidence of ecosystem decline**. Three likely reasons they identify -- past increases in food production, technological innovations that decouple people from ecosystems, and time lags before well-being is affected -- provide few grounds for complacency, however. Raudsepp-Hearne and her coauthors accept the findings of the influential Millennium Ecosystem Assessment that the capacity of ecosystems to produce many services for humans is now low. Yet they uncover no fault with the composite Human Development Index, a widely used metric that incorporates measures of literacy, life expectancy, and income, and has improved markedly since the mid-1970s. Although some measures of personal security buck the upward trend, the overall improvement in well-being seems robust. The researchers resolve the paradox partly by pointing to evidence that **food production** (which has increased globally over past decades) **is more important** for human well-being **than are other ecosystem services**. They also establish support for two other explanations: that **technology and innovation have decoupled human well-being from ecosystem degradation**, and that there is a time lag after ecosystem service degradation before human well-being will be affected.

## AT Anthro Aff

The human subject is the only basis for measuring value. **Grey 93** writes[[17]](#footnote-17)

My aim however is not to bury anthropocentrism, but to defend it, at least in a qualified form. My claim is that **if we attempt to step too far outside the** scale of the **recognizably human, rather than expanding** and enriching **our moral horizons we render them meaningless**, or at least almost unrecognizable. The grand perspective of evolutionary biology provides a reductio ad absurdum of the cluster of non-anthropocentric ethics which can be found under the label "deep ecology". **What deep ecology seeks to promote, and** what deep ecologists seek to **condemn, needs to be articulated from a distinctively human perspective**. And this is more than the trivial claim that our perspectives, **values** and judgements **are necessarily human** <464> perspectives, values and judgements. **Within the moral world we** do **occupy a privileged position**.

Some amount of human centeredness is inevitable – we can never fully understand the non-human

**Parker 96** writes[[18]](#footnote-18)

I have spoken of the experience of organisms‑in‑environments as centrally important. **Pragmatism is "anthropocentric**" (or better, "anthropometric")24 in one respect: **the human organism is inevitably the one that discusses value**. This is so because **human experience**, the human perspective on value, **is the only thing we know** as humans. Many other entities indeed have experience and do value things. Again, this is not to say that human whim is the measure of all things, only that **humans are** in fact **the measurers.** This must be a factor in all our deliberations about environmental issues. We can and should speak on the others' behalf when appropriate, but **we cannot speak from their experience**. We can in some sense hear their voices, but we cannot speak in their voices. I see no way out of our own distinctively human bodies. In this sense, **the human yardstick of experience becomes,** by default, **the measure of all things**. Although the debate over environmental issues is thus limited to human participants, this is not inappropriate ‑ after all, the debate centers almost exclusively on human threats to the world. Wolves, spotted owls, and old­growth forests are unable to enter the ethics debate except through their human spokespersons, and that is perhaps regrettable. Far better that they should speak for themselves! Lacking this, they do at least have spokespersons ‑ and these spokespersons, their advocates, need to communicate their concerns only to other humans. To do this in anthropic value categories is not shameful. It is, after all, the only way to go.

Anthro is key to space col which solves extinction. Avoiding human extinction is a precondition for the aff’s ethics.

**Baum 9** writes[[19]](#footnote-19)

It is of note that **the priority of reducing the risk of human extinction persists in forms of CBA which value nature** in an ecocentric fashion, i.e. **independently of** any consideration of **human interests**. The basic reason is that **without humanity leading long-term survival efforts** (which would most likely include space colonization), **the rest of Earth life would perish** as a result of the astronomical processes described above. This point is elaborated by futurist Bruce Tonn, who argues on ecocentric grounds for reorienting society to focus on avoiding human extinction through both immediate avoidance of catastrophe and long-term space colonization [40]. Tonn dubs this process of surviving beyond Earth’s eventual demise ‘‘transcending oblivion’’ [41]. There is thus some convergence in the recommendations of the common anthropocentric, money-based CBA and the ecocentric CBA described here. This convergence results from the fact that (in all likelihood) **only humans are capable of colonizing space, and thus human survival is necessary for Earth life to transcend oblivion**.

# Econ

**Growth Links**

Resource extraction solves growth and poverty from rural outmigration. Regulations solve resource curse.

**AUCC 12** writes[[20]](#footnote-20)

Poverty, in its various dimensions, has always been and remains at the centre of the development problematic. The aim and most general objective of the research network and team set up by the applicant and the collaborator is to examine this poverty-development problematic in the context of **Zacatecas** (**Mexico**), a state that over the years **has experienced** the most **dramatic** rate of **rural outmigration** in all of Mexico, **but** that **is now looking to** the industry of natural **resource extraction** (gold and silver mining) **as a development pathway out of poverty** for the rural population. The purpose of this examination and associated research is to generate better and more knowledge about the policy dynamics of two alternative development pathways out of poverty-migration and natural resource extraction (mining). In the absence of perceived alternatives **outmigration has been the traditional response to** the widespread and deepening **crisis in ag**ricultural **production** that has afflicted the state. **But** this response is not a solution to the crisis and the endemic poverty associated with it, in that **migration robs the economy of its most productive members**; and despite ideas and arguments to the contrary, the remittances of the **income earned by** these **migrant workers** also **do not constitute a** development **pathway out of poverty. A more promising pathway**, we suggest, **is** constituted by a recent revival of a traditional **industry based on an abundant supply of** silver, gold and other strategic **minerals.** Traditionally, a national or local development strategy based on natural resource extraction has been subject to what **economists have described** as **a ‘resource curse’**,which is that the benefits of the extracted wealth of natural resources has tended to disproportionately benefit foreign investors and the mining companies at the expense of local communities and the country as a whole; indeed, more often than not natural resource or mineral extraction has had few development spread effects, with the economic, with social and environmental costs far exceeding its benefits for the owners of the wealth. **However,** there are reasons to believe that conditions today have significantly improved and that **under the new regulatory regime adopted by many resource-rich** commodity exporting **countries,** the **development potential** of mining and natural resource extraction **could be very positive** both for the local rural communities and the country as a whole. Indeed, **this is the rationale behind the Canadian government’s recent announcement** of its decision **to launch development projects in partnership with mining firms**. It is also the rationale of our proposal to examine the policy dynamics and development implications of Canadian mining in Zacatecas, and to do on the basis of collaborative research and an academic alliance between two universities that share a commitment to the search for development pathways out of rural poverty and the design of appropriate public policy-policies for sustainable development.

Multiple international organizations agree. Resource extraction is key to the African economy.

**Cohanpour 13** writes[[21]](#footnote-21)

A new report, launched Sept. 26 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, indicates that African economic growth has been resilient amidst global economic downturns and regional crises. The 2013 African Economic Outlook Report (AEO), sponsored by the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), examines Africa's current growth and highlights room for development in the realm of natural resources. With a priority theme entitled "Structural Transformation and Natural Resources," the Report indicates that Africa's economic growth was 4.2 percent in 2012 and is projected to accelerate to 4.5 percent in 2013 and further to 5.2 percent in 2014. The AEO recommends that **in light of continent-wide** economic **growth, harnessing Africa's strong** natural **resource sector is** of greater **importance** now more than ever in order **to catalyze structural transformation**. "The general intended audience for the AEO 2013 Report is academics, civil society leaders, and governments as a basis to help them make informed decisions," explains Steve Kayizzi-Mugerwa, Director of Development Research at AfDB, to MediaGlobal News. "Governments like the fact that it is a tool that has been generated by Africans in collaboration with others instead of relying solely on multilateral organizations." **According to the U**nited **N**ations **Economic Commission for Africa** (UNECA)**, "the main sources of dynamism" are expected to be** the **expansion of ag**riculture **and** a rise in **oil production as well as mining**. The AEO's country case studies demonstrate variability in the stock of natural resources across the continent, but also indicate that **each nation's** available **resources provides a unique starting point** for "structural transformation" **through linkages with other sectors**. Henri-Bernard Solignac-Lecomte, Head of the Europe, Middle East, and Africa Unit of OECD, analyzed the case study findings as they relate to this year's priority theme. "We always come to the example of **Botswana** that **has been able to manage** very **wisely their immense wealth of** its **resources**. However, it is very difficult to see where to invest the revenues," Solignac-Lecomte tells MediaGlobal News. "**In terms of L**east **D**eveloped **C**ountrie**s,** for example, **you can look at** the recent results of **Burkina Faso and Mali**. There is a case in saying that **the mining industry** has **created new opportunities in** economic **development." In West Africa, the OECD and AfDB foresee rapid** regional **growth** with rates of 6.7 percent and 7.4 percent in 2013 and 2014 respectively, **taking into account the importance of** continuing the growth seen in the **oil and mining** sectors. In West African LDCs such as Benin, Cape Verde, and Guinea-Bissau, growth will remain relatively subdued, depending on these nation's abilities to better allocate resources and drive growth in the "demand side" through increased consumption and investment. Similar growth projects are seen for the majority of East Africa, including LDCs such as Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Uganda. **In Central Africa, the AEO projects above-average growth in Chad and the** Democratic Republic of **Congo in light of increased mining** and construction **projects**, but remains reserved due to needed progress in political stability and security. According to the UN Development Programme (UNDP), **African nations must extract** natural **resource wealth** in order **to accelerate** the pace of the economic **growth**. The AEO, in addition to outlining country case studies, recommends certain initiatives for African nations to spearhead this structural transformation.

Resource extraction is key to African growth. Multiple warrants.

**Ngangira 11** writes[[22]](#footnote-22)

Nevertheless, **major progress in** developing **the resource sector is taking shape across Africa**. Closer home, Mozambique’s concerted efforts in promoting investment in resources sector are paying dividends with the recent discovery of 13 billion more tonnes of thermal and coking coal reserves in the Zambeze area, bringing the country’s total coal reserves to over 23 billion tonnes. Coking or metallurgical coal is a key ingredient in steelmaking while thermal coal is used in power generation. Analysts forecast Mozambique to become the world's largest coking coal exporter after Australia. Riversdale, the Australian mining company that discovered the Zambeze coal reserves, has generated a lot of interest globally and is now a subject of a take-over bid by international mining companies. Rio Tinto has offered nearly US$4 billion to acquire the company. Riversdale is also planning to construct a 500MW coal-fired power plant in Tete province. Added to that is another recent discovery of natural gas in the far north Rovuma Basin, Mozambique, by US firm Anadarko. The discovery heightened the exploration drive and a second well drilled led to a discovery of oil and gas, suggesting that the country could be loaded with hydrocarbon riches. Natural gas is so far seen to present the greatest opportunity for power generation and export as liquefied natural gas (LNG). The state power firm Electricidade de Mocambique (EMD) plans to develop a 1GW (i.e. 1000 MW) gas-fired power plant. With excess power production, the country will be marketing its power on the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP). Other major players in that country include Vale of Brazil, which is operating the Moatize coal project and is planning a major rail network development. For sure, Mozambique’s state revenues will wax greatly. **In Guinea’s Simandou iron** ore **complex,** Rio Tinto partnered by Chinalco, International Finance Corporation and Guinea government, was first off the blocks in developing its iron-ore project. What then are the benefits? **The $10 billion project under construction is said to be “the largest** integrated **mine-and-infrastructure project ever developed in Africa”** and will undoubtedly transform the West African country’s economic landscape and put West Africa in the same league with the world’s top iron ore producers Brazil and Australia. Ninety percent of the current 1,600 workers at the project are Guinean and at peak construction a total of **13,000 workers will be hired** and eventually 4,000 workers will remain at production stage (i.e. actual mining stage). Infrastructure work has already begun with the revamping of national roads, construction of vocational training centres, development of service and construction wharfs (dockside), power generation facilities. And there is more, **royalties and taxes will** also **find their way into the government’s coffers**. We can also draw lessons from other major developments taking place in the resource sector elsewhere in the world. In Mongolia, the Oyu Tolgoi $6 billion copper-gold mine under construction is another interesting big mining project. Dubbed to become one of the biggest copper-gold mines on the planet, the mine is 66% owned by Canadian company Ivanhoe Mines and 34% by the Mongolian government. The sheer pace of the project, which currently employs over 5,500 workers and is scheduled to start commercial production late in 2012, is captivating. Some of the mine’s highlights include the following: It will produce 554,000 tonnes of copper and 18.7 tonnes of gold per annum. (For comparison purposes, Zambia’s total copper output in 2009 was 655,000 tonnes, investment-starved Zimbabwe’s 2010 total gold output was projected at 7 tonnes). The mine will have a concentrator which processes 100,000 tons of ore per day. A 105km fully-paved highway linking the Mongolian-China boarder is being constructed as well as a regional airport with a concrete runway to accommodate Boeing 737-sized aircraft. A 20-megawatt power station and a 35-kilovolt distribution system will be constructed and installed. Then there is a $58 million technical and vocational training programme to equip 3,300 Mongolians for jobs at the mine. 200 scholarships will be offered to students to study at Mongolian and international universities. 60% and 90% of construction and production jobs respectively will be is held by Mongolians. In addition, **contracts valued at hundreds of millions** of dollars **are reserved for Mongolian companies**. The project will, undoubtedly, have a significant impact on that country’s economy and presents a good case study for African countries. Other Sub Sahara African countries experiencing significant investment activity in mining are Zambia (copper), DRC (copper etc), Tanzania (gold, uranium), Angola (deepwater oil), Botswana (coal, diamond) and Namibia (uranium). The DRC, however, has the most fascinating potential. With estimated mineral resources in excess of US$24 trillion, no wonder we are witnessing a rush by major mining firms to that country. As partly demonstrated above, we should always put emphasis on promoting mining holistically –training programmes and facilities for locals, value addition like processing of mineral ore before export and even setting up manufacturing plants as opposed to always exporting unprocessed mineral ore. A case in point is platinum which is mined in Zimbabwe and shipped to South Africa as unprocessed ore for processing. Why should we continue to ship out value? That said, any natural resources and commodities story could not be complete without looking at their current biggest market - the emerging (or is it emerged) economic powers, China and India – and drawing lessons from them. While the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) will remain the major force of economic growth, for now China stands out a mile apart. India is not too far behind. According to a research by Standard Chartered, **China is poised to be the world’s biggest economy by 2020 and** by **2030**; its economy will be 20% bigger than the current global economy! Of course backed by an internal market of 1.3 billion people (compared to about 700 million people in Europe and America combined) and rapid urbanisation, one can understand why the Chinese economy appears to be on steroids. More importantly, **the above points to a huge** and beckoning **market for African raw material exports**, especially **to China and India**. Potentially, **billions of revenue dollars** from exports of everything we have – i.e. copper, coal, platinum, tantalite, gold, iron ore, diamonds, uranium, oil, soya beans, cotton, tobacco, sugar etc - **can come from the Asian market. Revenue from the resource sector can eliminate** our national debts and **poverty, create employment and ignite** practically **every sector of our economies**. To demonstrate the importance of natural resources and commodities (minerals, oil, gas and agricultural commodities e.g. wheat and corn) let’s take Australia whose economy was unscathed by the global recession, as an example. Its economic stability and prosperity can be attributed to its robust and world-beating resource sector. With global leadership in coal and iron ore exports and commercially producing over 50 different minerals, that country is benefiting immensely from the emerging economies’ demand for raw materials. In 2010, the country’s raw materials/commodities exports were set to surpass the $200 billion mark led by iron ore and coal exports! Efforts being made by the Zimbabwean government to take aboard serious international miners (who are friendly and willing) partnered by indigenous players for significant mining projects are commendable and will certainly bear fruits in exploiting the riches of e.g. the Great Dyke, Marange area and other mineral rich regions. Nobody can predict the future with certainty, but what is certain is that everything changes or perishes one way or the other, the only constant is the living God. The issues (sanctions, bad publicity and political discord) besetting Zimbabwe will come to pass. Any investor, especially private equity funds, which does not have Zimbabwe on their radar screens, will likely miss out as this resource-rich country warms up to unleash its full potential. Now, fast forward to 2030, with dedicated investment programmes in mining, energy and infrastructure projects, SANDMAZ (South Africa, Nigeria, DRC, Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, etc) could be the centre stage as the world’s top producers of platinum, copper, coking coal, seaborne thermal coal, tantalite, oil & gas, uranium, diamonds, gold and agricultural commodities like soya bean, cotton, beef, tobacco and corn/maize. Some members of this group will have with the highest GDP and economic growth rates in the world. The fast-paced growth in telecommunication is laying the foundations for an exponential growth. **As** we witness **a growing majority of young people throughout Africa**, who **will be hungry for jobs soon**er rather than later, **investing now in the resource sector could be a panacea for** employment creation and economic **growth for African countries** – Zimbabwe included. Globally, the demand for natural resources will continue to be driven by rapid urbanisation, quest for more energy/fuel, new technology and concerns over currency stability. Africa as a region has the largest reserves of natural resources and has the best long-term economic potential than any region on the planet. **Such is the resource blessing that we have** and it is this generation that should awaken and fight a good fight for economic development and prosperity.

The US proves. Resource extraction is key to manufacturing success and overall growth.

**Wright and Czelusta 4** write[[23]](#footnote-23)

**Resource abundance was a significant factor in** shaping if not **propelling** the **U.S.** path to **world leadership in manufacturing**. The coefficient of relative mineral intensity in U.S. manufacturing exports actually increased sharply between 1879 and 1914, the very period in which the country became the manufacturing leader (Wright 1990, 464–68). Louis **Cain and** Donald **Paterson** (1986) **find a significant materials-using bias** in technological change **in nine of twenty U.S. manufacturing industries between 1850 and 1919, including** many of **the largest and most successful** cases. A study of the world steel industry in 1907–9 put the United States on a par with Germany in total factor productivity (15 percent ahead of Britain), but the ratio of horseWright and Czelusta 10 Challenge/March–April 2004 power to worker was twice as large in America as in either of the other two contenders (Allen 1979, 919). **The American economy enjoyed abundant natural resources** during the country’s ascendance to world leadership**, yet economists do not seem inclined to downgrade U.S. performance on this account**. There is good reason to reject the notion that American industrialization should be somehow discounted because it emerged from a setting of unique resource abundance: On closer examination, the **abundance of** American **mineral resources should not be seen as** merely a **fortunate natural endowment. It is** more appropriately understood as a form of collective learning, **a return on large-scale investments in** exploration, transportation, geological knowledge, **and** the **tech**nologies **of** mineral **extraction**, refining, and utilization. This case is set out in detail by Paul David and Gavin Wright (1997) and may be briefly summarized here. For one thing, the timing of increases in production of a range of minerals in the United States is striking. Leadership or near-leadership in coal, lead, copper, iron ore, antimony, magnesite, mercury, nickel, silver, and zinc all occurred between 1870 and 1910. Surely this correspondence in timing cannot have been coincidental. In direct contrast to the notion of mineral deposits as a nonrenewable “resource endowment” in fixed supply, **new deposits were continually discovered, and production of** nearly all major **minerals continued to rise** well into the twentieth century—for the country as a whole, if not for every mining area considered separately. To be sure, this growth was to some extent a function of the size of the country and its relatively unexplored condition prior to the westward migration of the nineteenth century. But mineral discoveries were not mere by-products of territorial expansion. Some of the most dramatic production growth occurred not in the Far West but in older parts of the country: copper in Michigan, coal in Pennsylvania and Illinois, oil in Pennsylvania and Indiana. Many other countries of the world were large, and (as we now know) well endowed with minerals. But no other country exploited its geological potential to the same extent. Using modern geological estimates, David and Wright (1997) show that the **U.S. share of world mineral production in 1913 was far in excess of its share of world reserves. Mineral development was thus an integral part of** the broader process of national **economic development.**

Fossil fuels are key to economic growth of developing countries. There’s no alternative.

**Levi 13** writes[[24]](#footnote-24)

**Moving away from fossil fuels could be devastating for** some of **the** world's **poorest countries**. For as long as people have talked about moving beyond fossil fuels, another tantalizing prospect has hovered over the horizon: the decline of resource-rich authoritarian countries and the rogue nonstate actors that depend on them. A world of reduced demand for coal, oil, and gas is a world in which Iran, Russia, and various al Qaeda supporters are significantly weakened. That would certainly qualify as good news. But visiting Mozambique last week, I was reminded that not all of the losers from lower fossil-fuel demand will be the traditional bad guys. Mozambique's economy has tripled in size in the decade since the end of the country's 15-year-long civil war, but GDP per capita remains barely over $1,000 a head -- and highly concentrated among relatively wealthy elites. Leaders in Maputo, the capital, relied on international aid for 40 percent of the national budget last year. But an end is in sight: **Massive coal deposits and offshore natural gas are poised to end Mozambique's aid dependence and** rapidly **increase** economic **output.** The most bullish projections are far from assured -- Mozambique suffers from a lack of skilled labor, regulatory capacity, and essential infrastructure. But perhaps the biggest unknown is demand for what the country hopes to sell. If the world were to sharply reduce its dependence on fossil fuels, appetite for Mozambique's exports would decline or vanish, likely leaving the country in considerably worse shape. **Mozambique is hardly the only country** that would face this predicament. **Africa** in particular **is packed with countries for which resource extraction appears to be the only viable** first **rung** on the road **to** economic **growth**. Others in **Central and Southeast Asia, Latin America, and** the **South Pacific confront similar prospects**. Some plan to sell oil, gas, or coal. Others foresee extracting minerals like iron ore and bauxite, the processing of which requires massive amounts of fossil fuels. In a carbon-constrained world, however, consumers would need to cut back on their use of these minerals. Resource wealth is, of course, far from a guarantee of prosperity. Indeed, it can often bring the opposite: corruption, violence, and economic distortions that crowd out manufacturing and other industries, often deepening inequality in the process. But **save for a few lucky countries like Costa Rica** that have become favorite tourist destinations, **there are few alternatives to resource extraction for** many of **the poorest developing countries.** Development economist Paul Collier argues this point well in his powerful 2010 book, The Plundered Planet. The best alternative to suffering the resource curse, he explains, isn't necessarily forgoing resource development. It's harnessing revenues from resource extraction more effectively for broad and sustainable social and economic good. But while a great deal of effort has been expended looking at how low-carbon development could work in resource-consuming developing countries, very little time has been spent considering what it would look like for resource-rich developing countries. Entire careers are spent devising ideas for how China could power its economy using nuclear energy and renewable fuels, or how India could boost its resource efficiency. Not so when it comes to the travails of resource-rich countries. Many rightly mock demands for compensation from of the likes of Saudi Arabia, which would be hurt by reduced oil exports, but few stop to think about others that would suffer.

Australia proves. Resource extraction is key to growth and tech solves scarcity.

**Wright and Czelusta 4** write[[25]](#footnote-25)

Australia **The most striking success story is Australia**. Beginning in the 1960s, Australia witnessed a simultaneous resurgence of successful minerals search and economic growth. Across the board and almost without exception, production of minerals has increased rapidly. Figure 1 showcases a few of the dramatic surges in production of Australian minerals. Contrary to earlier fears, **increased production has not diminished mineral reserves**. From 1989 to 1999, **Australian mineral reserves expanded alongside production** for almost all minerals. As the Mining Journal reports: There have been 136 gold discoveries since 1970. . . . In other mineral sectors and against a background of difficult commodity prices, (more) recent Australian successes include an entirely new mineral sands province, the Murray Basin; the development of lateritic nickel deposits such as Murrin Murrin, Cawse and Bulong, and sulphide nickel deposits such as Black Swan, Cosmos and RAV 8; and major zinc and copper discoveries such as Century, Cannington and Ernst Henry. (“Exploration: The View from Down Under,” April 5, 2002, 244) The Myth of the Resource Curse Challenge/March–April 2004 29 **The Australian minerals sector has created** much **more wealth than it has depleted. The real value of Australia’s subsoil assets increased by** almost **150 percent** from 1990 to 1998, while the real value of the mining sector’s capital stock increased by 40 percent over the same period, almost twice the rate for all other industries (Stoeckel 1999, 18–19). The case of Australia demonstrates that **expansion of** a country’s **minerals** base **can go hand in hand with** economic **growth and tech**nological **progress. The Australian minerals sector**’s share of GDP expanded through the mid-1980s as Australia **reversed more than a century of relatively slow GDP growth**. New and old Australian industries also benefited. **Manufacturing industries with important connections to minerals include: metal and steel** products**, autos, industrial equipment, petroleum products, ships, and chemicals**. The Australian minerals sector is knowledge intensive. In the past ten years, **income from Australian intellectual property in mining has grown** from $40 million a year **to $1.9 billion a year**. R&D expenditures by the mining sector accounted for almost 20 percent of R&D expenditure by all industries in 1995–96 (Stoeckel 1999, 17), a disproportionate contribution relative to the sector’s share of GDP. **The mining sector’s contributions to Australia’s human capital are** also relatively **large. From July to September of 1996, the mining sector spent an average of $896 per employee on training**, while the average for all industries was $185; over the same period, the proportion of payroll spent on training was 5.8 percent for mining and 2.5 percent for all industries (ibid., 18). As **Australia’s mineral production has flourished since the abandonment of** thepassive **conservation policies of the** 19**30s**, the country has emerged as one of the world’s leaders in mineral exploration and development technology. “Australia leads the world in mining software and now supplies 60 to 70 per cent of mining software worldwide” (ibid., 25). Australia’s unique geology calls for unique science; for example, World Geoscience, an Australian company, is a leader in the development of airborne geophysical survey techniques. Industry leaders have put forward an ambitious technological vision known as the “glass Earth project,” a complex of six new technologies that would allow analysts to peer into the top kilometer of the Earth’s crust to locate valuable mineral deposits. One executive stated: “The discovery of another Mt. Isa or Broken Hill—and we think they are out there—would lift us to fifth [place in the world]” (Cave 2001, 7). Yet many of the technologies coming out of Australia’s particular geological conditions find applications in other parts of the world and “Australian mining companies search the world for minerals, (with) the bigger Australian companies now spending 30–40 per cent of their exploration budgets offshore” (Stoeckel 1999, 31).

Resource extraction is key to the African hospitality and real estate industries.

**Douglas 3-7** writes[[26]](#footnote-26)

[Brackets in original.] According to Wayne Troughton, founder and CEO of hospitality and property consulting firm HTI Consulting, it is interesting to see how eastern Africa has become the new West Africa in terms of demand for hotel expansion around recent oil and gas discoveries. For example, **oil has been found in Uganda and Kenya**, and Tanzania and Mozambique are believed to be sitting on one of the biggest gas reserves in the world. “Just to put it in context, they believe there is enough gas [in Mozambique] to sustain China for the next 30 years,” Troughton told . “**So you are seeing** a **significant growth in real estate**, other asset classes, **and** also in **hospitality** in these areas in order **to** be able to **sustain [**the **extraction** of these resource discoveries**].” With some** of these **discoveries** being made **in areas with little or no infrastructure,** Troughton said **Africa is seeing** the **growth of** a number of **boom towns** which can go from having a tiny population to seeing 7,000-10,000 people enter the space for work purposes. Boom towns and the hospitality lifecycle HTI Consulting has been conducting feasibility studies and providing financial and development consulting to the hospitality industry – in 35 countries in Africa and the Middle East – for over 10 years. According to Troughton, the firm has done considerable consulting in a number of African boom towns, which have developed around the discovery of oil and gas. He explained that while these discoveries may not result in much GDP growth until after production starts, the hospitality industry sees benefits from the get go. “What you have is different lifecycles. **When** they are **starting with exploration they bring in consultants, they bring in engineers**, they bring in geo-technical people, they bring in their senior people to come in and assess the opportunities,” Troughton added. “So when they are doing exploration **they get** many **more higher level people coming in and staying** in top hotels, four- or five-star hotels.” **For this reason, resource discoveries can result in** a **demand for high end hotel accommodation**, generally for short term stays of about a week or two. However, Troughton explained that **when** these **extractive companies** start to **move into** their **production phase there is** a **demand for lower-end, permanent accommodation**, where middle to lower level managers need apartments or apartment-type hotels. “So we actually often see the boom occurring in hospitality preceding the boom in GDP,” he added. Catering for supporting services Troughton added that demand for accommodation is not always driven by the oil and gas companies coming in to an African country, but often the supporting organisations, such as the logistics and distribution services. “They can generate between three to five times more room nights than the actual main oil company because of their role,” he added. With plans to build liquefied natural gas plants (LNG) around the natural gas reserves in Mozambique and Tanzania, Troughton expects there to be a significant increase in travel to these areas over the next four to five years. “Around about 2017 to 2020 is where we start to see these plants start to come alive so the next five years we are seeing huge potential for growth in these markets because people have to build these LNG plants,” continued Troughton. Alongside this will be the construction of transport infrastructure to export the oil and gas, such as ports, as well as office and retail space for construction companies and the needs of foreign investors entering the space. And all of these people will require various forms of accommodation to meet their travel and business needs. Mixed-use and distressed building developments “**One of the other trends** that we are starting to see **coming into Africa** more and more **is** the trend of **mixed-use developments, [for example] where a hotel is attached to a shopping mall**,” said Troughton. He added that very often **mixed-use developments can generate** anywhere **between 15%-20% more revenue**. “In Africa it’s even more important because you have a lack of infrastructure… there are security issues and people don’t want to travel at night, or restaurants are not available elsewhere. So if you can keep it all in one particular node [it is an advantage].” In addition, Troughton highlighted the trend of old, distressed assets, often owned by governments, being converted and developed. He said they offer good opportunities for investors who can get them at lower prices and convert them profitably. “We are seeing a lot of this happening in Africa at the moment,” he concluded.

**Institutions Cards**

Institutional issues are alt causes to lack of growth which the aff can’t solve.

**Singh and Bourgouin 13** write[[27]](#footnote-27)

What is overlooked in the literature is the nature of the latent relationship between resource governance and neoliberalism. The principal challenge for resource-rich developing states today rests not only in grafting institutional reforms that address problems of resource dependency but also the associated costs of economic liberalisation. Put simply, the **chronic failure for developing countries to** push for **sustain**ed economic **growth cannot be attributed fully to resource dependency;** instead, **political economy and institutional factors shape development outcomes**, and resource-rich states are not exceptions here (Barbier, 2011; Di John, 2009 ; Rosser, 2006a). While formal institutions certainly matter, **it remains** highly **questionable whether policy changes to address** the **challenges posed by the inherent nature of extractive capital can alter myopic decision-making** and clientelist politics **that** are both **cause** and consequence of **rent-seeking,** bureaucratic **inefficiencies, and weak state capacity.** Development policy-making is, after all, a complex, messy enterprise that is usually a product of trial and error rather than sound policy foresight (Haggard, 1990). However, developmental challenges are found not only at the national level. States must also respond to the changing global political economy. As the rate of mergers and acquisitions increases in extractive sectors (Campbell, 2009), resourcerich countries are faced with the challenge of negotiating developmental spaces with private capital in an oligopolistic world market for resources. Indeed, the processes by which, prior to the commodity boom, global governance institutions and states sought to reform the resource sector in the South reveal the ways in which sector-specific characteristics mediate the impacts of neoliberal reform agendas in the wider developing world. This certainly calls for a more robust account of the interactions between resource management and neoliberalism.

Countries with weaker institutions benefit more from RE.

**Alexeev and Conrad 8** write[[28]](#footnote-28)

The results presented in Table 2C show some evidence of the importance of the interaction between institutions and natural resources although this evidence points to countries with weaker institutions benefiting more from natural resources. The coefficients of the interactive terms are negative but they are not statistically significant in two out of five regressions. Moreover, the economic significance of these coefficients is small relative to the positive effect of natural resource wealth, because the coefficients of the interactive terms are always smaller in absolute value than the coefficients of the direct terms, and because the rule of law index is centered around zero, making the average value of the interactive term small in all but one equation. In the corresponding regressions based on Acemoglu et al. (2001) sample the coefficients of the interactive terms are also always negative, but statistical significance obtains only in one specification and only at 10% level. These results are available upon request. We do not claim, of course, that good institutions hurt long-term growth. Instead, we conclude that **countries with good institutions that would have been rich anyway**, tend to **benefit less** from the positive effect of natural resources **while countries with weak institutions that would have been poor in the absence of substantial natural endowment reap** relatively **large benefits** from their natural resource wealth. In other words, Norway would have done well with or without oil, but Kuwait without oil would have been poor. This result contradicts the findings of Mehlum et al. (2006). In their work that used average growth rates of GDP between 1965 and 1990, the effect of the interactive term on economic growth was positive while the direct effect of natural resource abundance was negative. We will address another aspect of the interaction between institutions and natural resources in the next section. **The above results hold almost as strongly,** both **for oil and** for other **minerals, when we use per capita GDP for 1970 as a dependent variable** and measures of oil importance for 1970 instead of the corresponding variables for year 2000.16 This fact confirms our earlier statement that **oil and** other **mineral resources have had a significant effect on** the **countries’ income for a long time. Our results** also **hold** just as **strongly for** the alternative measures of institutional quality such as **control of corruption and government effectiveness.**

No resource curse and resources don’t affect institutional quality. Slavic countries prove.

**Alexeev and Conrad 8** write[[29]](#footnote-29)

Interestingly, the Slavic countries that emerged from the former Soviet Union, while absent from our regressions, provide additional evidence for our claims. Although this evidence is anecdotal, it is hard to dismiss because to a large extent, the experience of **Belarus**’, **Russia, and Ukraine** can serve as a natural experiment with respect to the influence of oil and mineral resource endowment on growth and institutions. These three countries **have had very similar** cultural, **institutional** and structural economic **legacies due to the fact that they** are predominantly Slavic and **for many years were well-integrated parts of the Soviet economic space. A major difference** among them **is** in their **natural resource endowment, with Russia having** by far **the greatest deposits** of oil, gas, and minerals**, and Belarus having almost none. Ukraine’s** size of natural resource **endowment is in-between** those of Russia and Belarus’. **If the** natural **resource curse were to exist, Russia would** be expected to **have the worst institutions and lowest per capita GDP** of the three countries**, and Belarus’ would have the best indicators**. As the numbers below demonstrate, **the reality dramatically deviates from this prediction.**

**Solvency Prereq**

**General**

Solving growth is a prereq to aff solvency. **EcoVitality 99** writes[[30]](#footnote-30)

**Neither environmental law nor** environmental **education has been able to counter** the overwhelming **priority placed on** economic **development in virtually all poor countries.  Neither environmental law nor** environmental **education can succeed when people lack viable economic alternatives---poor people will not let their families starve to save trees or tigers**, no matter how much they appreciate nature--**and most people in developing nations want more than minimal subsistence**.  Environmental law and education rely mainly on the impact of words, words that are often no more than idealized exhortations, but conservation-oriented words have seldom been compelling enough to produce meaningful conservation actions in the developing countries.

**Democracy**

Protests in developing countries are on the rise due to lack of democracy, risks Ukraine war. Developing country growth is key to democracy. **Kurlantzick 3-10** writes[[31]](#footnote-31)

As **protests roiling developing countries have spiraled into government collapse**, general **instability, and—in the case of Ukraine**, at least**—possible war**, numerous observers have blamed the Obama administration for its seeming passivity. The White House, on this view, has been both over-tolerant of aggressive autocrats like Vladimir Putin and uninterested in standing up for democracy and human rights. President Obama pursues a “feckless foreign policy where nobody believes in America’s strength anymore,” Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) said last week. The charge that the Obama White House has been soft on autocracy is hard to make stick. Obama did call for a “reset” in relations with Russia, echoing attempts by George W. Bush and prior presidents to make fresh starts with the Kremlin early in their terms. But the White House has now imposed tough sanctions on Russian leaders. Obama has taken basically the same approach as the Bush administration did to such other autocracies as China and Venezuela, even though his predecessor sometimes hid private conciliation behind tough public condemnations of Chinese or Venezuelan leaders. What’s more, in countries like Venezuela or China, where top leaders can play on anti-U.S. sentiment, harsh public rhetoric from American presidents often backfires, boosting leaders’ popularity. The claim that this White House has ignored fundamental aspects of promoting democracy holds up better than the notion that the administration is soft on autocrats. The U.S. is not the reason these developing nations are struggling with democracy. The **countries facing** serious **unrest**—Cambodia, Egypt, Venezuela, Thailand—**face serious challenges in** having **weak institutions, elected leaders who behave like autocrats, and populaces** that have become **addicted to street protest**. The people most important to making these democracies work are their leaders, voters, and activists. But disinterest inside the White House in promoting democracy has exacerbated democracy’s global crisis. With three years left in its term, the Obama administration still has time to try. Right now, in war zones like Ukraine, the U.S. and other wealthy democracies have no time to think long-term. But in many other developing nations that are struggling to make democracy work, outside assistance could play an important—though not the most important—role. Even in Ukraine, if war is averted and peace restored, the right assistance could help democratically end a decade of chaos that got Kiev where it is today. For one thing, rich countries can help democrats in the developing world prevent their economies’ growth rates from stagnating or declining. **Slowing growth has sparked protests and collapses of democracies** around the world**, including** in **Ukraine**. Indeed, **the Community of Democracies, a global talk shop of democratic governments,** has **repeatedly warned that economic stagnation is the biggest threat to democracy**. Many **“elected autocrats,”** such as Ukraine’s former president, Viktor Yanukovych, **couldn’t have won office had it not been for severe** economic **downturns that darkened the reputations of** more **politically and economically liberal politicians** in their countries. It’s easy to write about avoiding stagnation. Every nation in the world, developed or developing, wants to avoid severe economic downturns. But the grave danger of stagnation to emerging democracies’ political survival means that the developed world and its aid organizations must think more carefully about whether economic policies they prescribe are likely to depress developing economies, at least for a time, and thus harm the prospects for democratization. The White House and other **leaders can** also **help developing nations strengthen their democracies, not just hold elections**. As we have seen in Cambodia, Venezuela, and elsewhere, simply holding elections does not make a democracy. But Western leaders usually focus almost exclusively on elections. Donors like the U.S. should recalibrate their funding so that larger percentages of aid for democracy go toward building institutions and less toward organizing and holding votes. To shift funding toward foundations of democracy, donors could shift budgeting for democracy promotion from being renewed annually—at the whims of the faltering U.S. Congress—to being renewed every two or three years, a change some that Scandinavian nations already have made. American administrations, whether Democratic or Republican, also too often tend to associate reform with one supposedly groundbreaking leader in a developing nation, a democratic “big man.” In rare cases, such a leader exists: Nelson Mandela was not only dedicated to reform but possessed moral authority and enough control of his political party and allies to almost singlehandedly push South Africa through transition. There has been only one Nelson Mandela. When Washington focuses on an all-important figure such as Myanmar’s Aung San Suu Kyi, it detracts from broader support for the country’s transition. And when that leader turns out to be less than perfect, as Suu Kyi has—or much more flawed, as Afghanistan’s Hamid Karzai has—American officials act like jilted lovers rather than realizing that there are many other people important to building democracy in these countries.

Democracy is a prerequisite to sustainable development.

**Anderson and Huggins 3** writes[[32]](#footnote-32)

**Institutions that promote democratic governments are a prerequisite for sustainable development** and enhanced environmental quality. **Where democracy dwells, constituencies for environmental protection can afford to exist-without** people **fearing arrest or prosecution**. The **democratization** of thirty-plus countries **in the last twenty-five years has dramatically improved** the **prospects for environmental protection** (Desta 1999).

**Aff Studies Bad**

**Self-Fulfilling Prophecy**

Prefer my evidence. The resource curse isn’t inevitable. It’s a self-fulfilling prophecy because their authors conceive of resources incorrectly.

**Wright and Czelusta 4** write[[33]](#footnote-33)

What is at stake in this debate? The resource-curse hypothesis seems anomalous as development economics, since on the surface it has no clear policy implication but stands as a wistful prophecy: Countries afflicted with the “original sin” of resource endowments have poor growth prospects. The danger of such ostensibly neutral ruminations, however, is that in practice they may influence sectoral policies. **Minerals themselves are not to blame for** problems of **rent-seeking and corruption.** Instead, **it is** largely **the manner in which policymakers** and businesses **view minerals** that determines the outcome. **If minerals are conceived as fixed stocks, and** mineral **abundance** as **a “windfall” unconnected to past investment,** then **the problem becomes one of divvying up the bounty rather than creating more** bounty. **Minerals are not a curse** at all **in the sense of inevitability; the curse**, where it exists, **is self-fulfilling.**

**Exports**

Resource curse studies are flawed. They rely on a flawed understanding of exports.

**Wright and Czelusta 4** write[[34]](#footnote-34)

The **resource-curse** literature pays little attention to the economic character of mineral resources or to the concept of “resource abundance.” Theirs is indeed a black box approach. Virtually without exception, these **studies equate** the **export of mineral products with “resource abundance**,**”** seen as a simple reflection of an exogenously given geological “endowment.” When the revenues from this activity are described, terms such as “windfalls” and “booms” are generally not far behind. **This synonymy is** a matter of implicit assumption rather than analysis or demonstration, generally unquestioned, and all too often unrecognized. On closer scrutiny, each step in this chain of equivalences is **questionable**. To begin, **comparative advantage** in resource products **is not equivalent to “resource abundance.”** The elementary theory of international trade teaches that every country has a comparative advantage in something. A **comparative advantage in** natural **resources may simply reflect** an absence of other internationally competitive sectors in the economy—in a word, **underdevelopment. Since indices of “development” are inherently imperfect, this statistical bias is not addressed by adding** a host of **additional variables into** a **cross-country regression. Studies that use more appropriate measures** of mineral abundance (**such as reserves per capita or** the **level of** natural resource **exports per worker**) **do not find that these variables are negatively associated with growth rates** (Maloney 2002; Stijns 2003).

**Tech**

Resource curse studies are flawed. Tech solves scarcity and resource abundance only entails low growth in countries that don’t develop their extraction potential.

**Wright and Czelusta 4** write[[35]](#footnote-35)

Historical studies show that **successful resource**-based **development is not primarily a matter of geological endowment. The U**nited **S**tates **was the world’s leading mineral economy** in the very historical period during which the country became the world leader in manufacturing (roughly between 1890 and 1910). Resource intensity was a pervasive feature of U.S. technological and industrial development. **But** with the aid of hindsight, we know that **the country’s mineral endowment was not** particularly **favorable**. Instead, **the U**nited **S**tates **developed** its **mineral potential well ahead of** countries on **other continents**, including Latin America, **on** the basis of large-scale investments in exploration, transportation, geological knowledge, and the **tech**nologies **of extraction**, refining, and utilization. It is fair to say that the minerals sector constituted a leading edge of the knowledge economy in U.S. history. The minerals sector is no less linked to advances in knowledge and technological capabilities in the modern world. Indeed, it is one of the high-tech industries of the global economy. **Fears of** impending **scarcity have been overwhelmed by tech**nological **progress in** exploration, **extraction**, and substitution over the past two centuries, **a fact well known to resource economists** (such as Krautkraemer 1998 and Tilton 2003), **though it rarely arises in the resource-curse literature**. Less well known is the fact that **returns to investments in** country-specific **minerals knowledge have stayed high in recent decades, so** that **production and reserve levels have continued to grow** in well-managed resource economies. Many other **resource-based economies have performed poorly, not because they have overemphasized minerals but** because **they** have **failed to develop their mineral potential** through appropriate policies. These issues matter precisely because of their relevance for policy decisions. What doctor would offer the diagnosis that her patient’s condition is hopeless and has been so from day one, attributing his The Myth of the Resource Curse Challenge/March–April 2004 9 ills to an ill-fated factor endowment? Would lenders and donors consider as evidence of “reform” decisions to suspend programs of minerals exploration, curtail the training of mining engineers, and terminate contracts with international mining companies? Perhaps not, but how else should policymakers understand the implications of a thesis that a country would be better off not knowing about its underground wealth potential? On the other hand, perhaps an appreciation of the knowledge-based character of the minerals sector might lead resource-curse advocates to reformulate their position and rethink its policy implications. Our position is that investment in minerals-related knowledge is a legitimate component of a forwardlooking economic development program. We support this position by examining cases of resource-based development, past and present.

Resource curse studies fail. They assume unsustainability but ignore tech developments that solve for scarcity.

**Wright and Czelusta 4** write[[36]](#footnote-36)

The Case of Norway The reader may accept this analysis as history and yet protest that it has little relevance for the newer oil-producing nations of the world. How could such newcomers expect to contribute to what is now an extremely advanced science-based world petroleum technology? In rebuttal, **consider** the example of **Norway**, in which the first commercial discoveries of oil occurred only in 1969. In many ways the Norwegian experience parallels that of California. Though not poor by world standards, Norway in the 1960s was remote and structurally underdeveloped. Yet in fairly short order, the country was able to reorient its traditional engineering skills from shipbuilding to become a full partner in the adaptation of oil exploration and drilling technologies to Norwegian conditions. Virtually from the start, negotiations with international oil companies emphasized the transfer of competence and control to Norway (Anderson 1993, 98–100). With the establishment of a state-owned company (Statoil) in 1973 and investment in the training of petroleum engineers at the Norwegian Technical University and Rogaland Regional College, “recipient competence” was transformed into “part icipant competence,” making it possible to speak of an independent Norwegian oil industry. **The Norwegian industry became expert at** producing **deepwater drilling platforms**. Initially designed to overcome immediate production bottlenecks, the platforms came to be export goods, as they proved useful for offshore drilling in other parts of the world. A distinctive approach to exploration developed at the University of Oslo’s Department of Geology, focusing on the properties of different types of sandstone as reservoir rock and the flow of water and oil in sediment basins, has come to be known as the “Norwegian school of thought” regarding oil exploration. **As a result of this approach, forecasts of impending depletion have been repeatedly overturned and reserve estimates adjusted**. In effect, these **advances in tech**nology and in the infrastructure of knowledge **have extended the quantity of Norway’s petroleum reserves**, and they have allowed Norwegians to participate in the process as well-paid professionals, not just as passive recipients of windfall economic rents. The Myth of the Resource Curse Challenge/March–April 2004 23 The Case of Venezuela Granted, Norway sets a high standard for national administrative competence and responsible democratic government, but it is “the complete antithesis of Venezuela,” according to Terry Lynn Karl (1997, 217). Oil-rich Venezuela is one of the world’s “most tremendous development failures” (Rodriguez and Sachs 1999, 277). After a strong performance from the 1920s to the 1970s, overall economic growth in Venezuela has been negative for twenty years or more. This dismal performance certainly shows that a favorable mineral endowment is no guarantee of sustained economic progress. But what exactly went wrong in Venezuela? Francisco Rodriguez and Jeffrey Sachs (1999) believe the problem is that natural resource industries “which rely on exhaustible factors of production, cannot expand at the same rate as other industries” (p. 278). They characterize the decline in Venezuelan oil exports per capita as a “simple depletion of a natural resource” (p. 284). But this interpretation is untenable. Despite the intragovernmental conflict described by Karl (1997), Venezuela’s state-owned oil development agency (Pétroleos de Venezuela, S.A., or PDVSA) has had considerable success in developing technologies appropriate for the unusual concentration of heavy oil in the Orinoco Belt. Countryspecific advances in heavy-oil technology led to a significant upward jump in reported Venezuelan reserves beginning in the 1980s, and the level of reserves has been rising since then. Aided by collaborative research agreements with BO Petroleum (a company with Canadian experience in heavy oil), PDVSA developed a new fuel, orimulsion, for use by power utilities and heavy industry. Orimulsion has favorable market prospects, because it has a potential for gasification, can be used in a combined fuel cycle, and is environmentally friendly. Nor can the growth implosion be traced to Dutch-disease distortions or unfavorable externalities associated with oil. As Ricardo Hausman points out in a persuasive critique: Wright and Czelusta 24 Challenge/March–April 2004 Venezuela’s growth collapse took place after 60 years of expansion, fueled by oil. If oil explains slow growth, what explains the previous fast growth? Moreover, the growth collapse occurred when oil revenues were declining, so that the Dutch disease should have operated in reverse, facilitating the growth of output in nonoil tradables: it did not happen. (2003, 246) Hausman shows that the decline in the nonoil Venezuelan economy is traceable to a massive rise in real interest rates, dating from the country’s loss of bond rating in the wake of its 1983 default. He attributes the subsequent continuation of low bond ratings to “distributive conflict surrounding the allocation of the decline in oil revenues” (ibid.). Unquestionably, this diagnosis of Venezuela’s growth implosion draws upon and perhaps thereby confirms some of the components of some of the critiques of resource-based development. Excessive reliance on a single commodity for export earnings is unwise, especially if the market in question is volatile and if it provides the major source of government revenues. As economists have long advised, it is imprudent for governments to make major spending commitments during periods of rapid revenue growth, as though this growth could be extrapolated into the indefinite future. In such a situation, adverse shocks are extremely stressful for any society, and in the case of Venezuela, it may have been more than the society could withstand.4 However one may assign responsibility for these events, the central point is that they should be understood as elements of a specific historical episode, not as recurring or inherent features of resource development. Still less do they constitute evidence for the transience of oil wealth. **Much of the resource-curse literature simply assumes nonsustainability, making no distinction between demand-side fluctuations and** the **determinants of long-run supply.**

**Hotelling Model Bad**

The Hotelling model is flawed. Resource scarcity is a myth and prices aren’t rising.

**Wright and Czelusta 4** write[[37]](#footnote-37)

Economists have known for some time that Harold **Hotelling’s** theoretical **prediction**, that the scarcity and relative prices of nonrenewable resources would rise inexorably over time, **has not been borne out by** the facts of **history**. Jeffrey **Krautkraemer’s recent comprehensive survey** of the evidence **reaches the following conclusions**: For the most part, the implications of this basic Hotelling model have not been consistent with empirical studies of nonrenewable resource prices and in situ values. **There has not been** a **persistent increase in** nonrenewable **resource prices** over the past 125 years. . . . **Economic indicators** of nonrenewable resource scarcity **do not provide evidence that nonrenewable resources are becoming significantly more scarce**. Instead, they suggest that other factors of nonrenewable resource supply, particularly the **discovery of new deposits,** technological **progress in extraction technology, and** the development of **resource substitutes, have mitigated** the **scarcity** effect of depleting existing deposits. (1998, 2066, 2091) But Krautkramer’s analysis, like virtually all economic writing on this subject (see Tilton 2003), is conducted at the level of the entire market supply for a commodity, which is to say the world as a whole. Although this approach may be appropriate for testing the Hotelling thesis, these conclusions leave open the possibility that the specter of depletion has only been staved off at the global level—i.e., in large part through the opening up of new or previously underexplored territories. What has not been appreciated is that the process of ongoing renewal of nonrenewable resources has operated within individual countries as well as across continents. Table 1 displays average annual growth rates of mine production for eight major minerals in six relatively well-managed mineral-proThe Myth of the Resource Curse Challenge/March–April 2004 33 ducing nations. The **strong positive growth rates for the world as a whole reinforce Krautkraemer’s point**. But **equally striking is** the **vigorous production growth of nearly every mineral in nearly every country**. The one notable exception (among the minerals displayed in Table 1) is lead mining, for which production has declined in the world as a whole. This decline is presumably related to lead’s unique position as a recyclable; two-thirds of consumption consists of scrap recovery, thus reducing demand for the newly mined mineral. For a true mineral economic success story like Australia, however, production growth has continued for every one of the minerals on the list, lead included. For the group taken as a whole, it is remarkable that production has expanded country by country across a twenty-year period during which real minerals prices have drifted downward. Many economists are aware of the global historical evidence but remain in the grip of the intuition that because minerals are nonrenewable, eventually they must grow scarcer—these forms of advance serve only to “mitigate” the Hotelling forecast, so that “finite availability . . . has not yet led to increasing economic scarcity of nonrenewable resources” (Krautkraemer 1998, 2103, emphasis added). But if examples of successful country-specific mineral development are so numerous, the question arises whether common underlying processes in such countries may exist, and this possibility in turn leads to reconsideration of the sustainability of nonrenewable resources as a base for economic development. Certainly we are not qualified to make pronouncements about the geographical distribution of minerals in the earth’s crust, much less within particular countries. But **a cursory reading of the geological lit**erature on mineral stocks **convinces us that most geologists would not be surprised** by the patterns we have described. DeVerle P. Harris, for example, notes in a survey article that ore deposits of a specific kind, e.g., massive sulfide copper, are created from common crustal material by earth processes that are characteristic of that deposit type. Consequently, such deposits exhibit some common characteristics irrespective of where they occur, e.g., in the African or North American continents. (1993, 1035) Among these characteristics are deposit size, average grade, intradeposit grade variation, and depth to deposit. Mapping the statistical properties of these distributions is now the object of sophisticated, large-scale computer modeling, such as the Minerals Availability System (MAS) of the U.S. Bureau of Mines. The broad picture that emerges from such investigations is that **the underlying elasticities of mineral supply are very high with respect to any** number of **physical and economic margins**. The more that is learned about the effects of deposit features on “discoverability,” with the information gain that occurs from continued exploration within regions, the more it is evident that the **potential for expansion of the resource base**—the economically meaningful concept of mineral resource endowment— **is vast if not unlimited.**

**Timeframe**

Aff studies analyze too short a time period. The authors account for this and say RE is key to growth.

**Alexeev and Conrad 8** write[[38]](#footnote-38)

In this paper, we argue that both major claims of the natural resource curse literature described above are due mostly to misinterpretation of the available data. First, we will demonstrate that so far **oil and mineral resources have enhanced** rather than inhibited **long-term growth**. Second, we will show that oil and minerals are largely neutral with respect to the quality of the countries’ institutions. To demonstrate the first point, **we** follow the approach of Hall and Jones (1999), Easterly and Levine (2003) and Rodrik et al. (2004) and **measure** long-term growth via **GDP per capita** levels **rather than** by **calculating growth rates over a given period of time**. The **direct determination** of the impact of mineral resources on the rates of growth **is hindered by** the **relative shortness of the** time **period for which** more or less **reliable data are available.** **Usually, growth rates are measured as an average** rate **for a 25-30 year period starting in 1965 or** in **1970**. While it is plausible that the oil and other mineral resource producers had had slower growth rates during this time, the main issue is presumably the effect of mineral resource endowment on the economic growth over the entire period of discovery and commercial use of the resource and beyond. For example, **most** of the **major oil exporters began commercial exploitation** of their oil wealth **well before 1950** (See Table 1). Therefore, **even if** the **existing empirical literature is correct, it is possible that a large oil endowment results in high growth rates in** the **early stages of extraction and slower rates when** the **oil deposits mature**. In fact, **Boyce and Emery** (2005) **demonstrate** in their dynamic general equilibrium framework **that such growth pattern may be optimal.**

**AT Sachs and Warner**

Sachs and Warner’s results are skewed. They don’t account for per capita GDP.

**Alexeev and Conrad 8** write[[39]](#footnote-39)

While we believe that the best measures of the role of natural resources in longterm growth are per capita measures, **Sachs and Warner** (2001) **contend that GDP should be in the denominator** of the natural resource dependence measures, **because the goal is to “measure the importance of** natural **resources in the economy, not just per capita.”** (p. 830, footnote 1) **The problem** with this statement, as we have just argued, **is that** the **“importance** of natural resources in the economy**” may be caused by factors unrelated to** natural **resources and this** consideration **biases the estimates in favor of “the curse.”** Nonetheless, to accommodate Sachs and Warner’s point, we use logarithm of one plus the ratio of the average value of oil output in 2000 to PPP GDP to show that our results are generally robust to using GDP shares.8 We use per capita PPP GDP data from Maddison (2006) that provides for a wider coverage, particularly of oil producers and less developed countries than the Penn World Tables often used in the literature. This is particularly true for 1970 PPP GDP data that are needed in order to make our results comparable to other work on the natural resource curse.

**Measurement Indicts**

Measuring resources as a share of GDP fails.

**Alexeev and Conrad 8** write[[40]](#footnote-40)

In order to estimate equation (1) we use several different measures of oil and mineral resource endowment, and different control variables. One measure of oil endowment is the logarithm of 1993 hydrocarbon deposits per capita from Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004). Another measure is the logarithm of one plus the country’s per capita production of oil in 2000 at world market prices. **Unlike much of the lit**erature**, we prefer to** use **measure**s of natural **resources** that are **not expressed as shares of GDP, because we are interested** precisely **in** the **effect of** natural **resources on GDP. If**, for example, **the share of oil output in GDP is used as an indicator of oil dependency,** then, given some output of oil, **a country that for whatever reason has low growth rates and low GDP would have a higher oil/GDP ratio. This would bias the results, artificially creating a negative effect of oil on GDP.**

Measuring resources as a share of GDP/total exports fails.

**Alexeev and Conrad 8** write[[41]](#footnote-41)

**We are** even more **skeptical about using** the **share of** natural **resource exports in GDP or** in **total exports**. The use of export-related measures of 10 oil dependence has a bias similar in nature to measures expressed in shares of GDP. In fact, the bias in the export-related measures is probably larger numerically, because **a more developed country may consume much of its** natural **resources domestically and export a smaller share** of its endowment, holding initial total reserves constant. Therefore, **an oil-producing country that has a relatively small GDP for reasons unrelated to oil would have a large ratio of** oil **exports to GDP, thus biasing the results toward the negative effect of oil on** both GDP and **growth**. **The same** argument **holds for** other **mineral resources.** The regressions that use export shares probably reveal the effect of low GDP and growth on the structure of exports rather than the other way around. It is not surprising, therefore, that some of our results do not hold for measures based on the share of natural resource exports in GDP. In addition, we do not think that the “natural capital” measure developed in World Bank (1997) is appropriate for our purposes, largely because it includes the value of arable land and, therefore, goes against most existing theoretical explanations of the natural resource curse. Instead, we concentrate on the “point-source” resources (Isham et al, 2003) or “lootable” resources in Mehlum et al’s (2006) terminology.7

**AT Dutch Disease**

Dutch disease doesn’t exist. Russia, Canada, the Netherlands and the Red Sox prove.

**McKenna 8** writes[[42]](#footnote-42)

WASHINGTON -- **The world has known** a plethora of **famous curses** - from King Tut's tomb to the Bambino and the Chicago Cubs' billy goat. None of these, however, has grabbed the attention of serious academics quite **like the curse of oil**. The theory is a simple one: Countries rich in oil and other natural resources typically - and counterintuitively - do less well economically over the long haul than other countries. The oil curse theory is a close relative of the so-called Dutch disease, a term coined by The Economist in 1977 to describe the vanishing manufacturing sector in the Netherlands after the discovery of natural gas a decade earlier. In a nutshell, a resource boom attracts a sudden flood of investment, pushes up the value of the currency and weighs down other sectors, including manufacturing and farming. Over the ensuing decades, economists have produced considerable research to support the oil curse. It has become a virtual economic truism, often helping to guide development aid by such institutions as the World Bank. Subsequent research has also linked resource wealth to weaker government institutions. Alas, **like all curses, this one was bound to be broken** some time**. The** Boston **Red Sox**, of course, have **won the World Series** twice in three years **after 86 years of futility**. Economists Michael Alexeev of Indiana University and Robert Conrad of Duke University argue in a new paper that, **like the Bambino's, the curse of oil is** really just **a myth.** "While mineral wealth may have some negative consequences for a country, the general curse of natural resources as understood in the current literature does not seem to exist," the authors conclude in a recently released paper, The Elusive Curse of Oil. The paper is due to be published in the Review of Economics and Statistics. The authors say **there is "little or no evidence" that** an **abundance of natural resources slows down** long-term economic **growth.** They also debunk the notion that oil wealth degrades public institutions. Institutions may not be markedly better, they said, but they are not any worse. The economists point to the post-Soviet collapse experience of **Russia, Ukraine and Belarus** as a "natural experiment" of the influence of oil and mineral resources. All three Slavic nations **emerged from the Soviet era with similar** cultural, governmental and **economic backgrounds, but** with distinctly **unequal resource wealth.** Russia was a powerhouse, Ukraine had less and **Belarus had none. If the curse exists, Belarus would have emerged the big winner.** That isn't the case. **It's Russia, and it isn't even close**, based on key measures, including gross domestic product per capita, rule of law, control of corruption and government effectiveness. "The comparison of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine is instructive because of its stark divergence from the prediction based on the natural resource curse," the study notes. So what about Canada? There's been a lively academic debate for decades about whether the country has enjoyed the full fruits of its various resource bonanzas - from fur and lumber to gold, hydro, Hibernia and the oil sands. The consensus among economists is that **Canada is a winner, and its resources are a big part of that success.** The country ranks highly in various global measures of well being (including fourth in the 2007-08 United Nations' Human Development Index and 5th in the 2007 Legatum Prosperity Index). And yet the debate endures, particularly now as a boom in one part of the country (Alberta) hurts another (Quebec and Ontario) by pushing the dollar higher and making other exports less competitive. Some economists argue that the latest energy boom hasn't necessarily been good for Canada, as high oil prices drag down large swaths of the economy. The more pertinent question is: Where would Canada be without its oil, its trees and its minerals? The implication of the latest research is that it would be a lot less well off. **And don't forget: Everything worked out pretty well for the Dutch in the end.**

There are multiple factors that Dutch Disease studies can’t account for which affect results.

**Reed 2** writes[[43]](#footnote-43)

Historically, the notion of economic development has been closely associated with processes of industrialization and the achievement of sustained levels of growth. There is a branch of economics that attempts to examine the contribution of resources industries to growth and development, viz., resource economics. **While this field has frequently noted** certain anomalies in terms of resource industries and growth (e.g., the so-called **"Dutch disease"**), **its ability to provide a cogent account of** such phenomenon and **the role of REIs in development** generally **has been subject to much criticism** (see, for example, Mikesell, 1997). There are several basic problems in understanding the role of REIs in promoting growth and development (which fields like resources economics have typically not problematized). The first problem relates to the fact that **REIs have been operating in** many **developing countries for** nearly **a century or more. Over this time, there have been dramatic changes in** the circumstances of developing countries, most notably perhaps in terms of **political organization**. Outside of Latin America, **a vast majority of developing countries were under colonial rule** for the first half of the 20th century, while in the post-colonial period they were frequently subjected to internal conflicts and non democratic governments. In Latin America, while most of the major countries were independent throughout the 20th century, **military coups and dictatorships** have been interspersed with democratic governments over the course of the century. A second problem with evaluating the role of REIs relates to **differences across** countries, viz., **geo-political significance, economic structure** (e.g., subsistence agricultural, plantations, ranching, manufacturing), **demographics** (e.g., ethnic and racial diversity)**, etc**. These differences can **dramatically affect** the **strategies and prospects of firms** (**in ways that traditional economic analysis does not capture**)**.**

**Growth/Poverty Outweighs**

Growth and poverty outweigh. Developing countries are not key to solve warming.

**Xinhua 7** writes[[44]](#footnote-44)

**Developed countries**, in their industrialization and modernization process, were the sources of unrestricted emissions of greenhouse gases, mainly carbon dioxide. These nations **account**ed **for 95 percent of** carbon dioxide **emissions worldwide** resulting from the use of fossil fuels from the start of the Industrial Revolution in 18th century to 1950, and for 77 percent in the 1950-2000 period. Continuing the upward trend in recent years, the **total g**reen**h**ouse **g**as **emissions of** major **industrialized countries reached 18**.2 **billion tons in** 20**05**, close to the all-time high of 18.7 billion tons set in 1990, **as data released by the UN**FCCC secretariat **show**. Developed countries, therefore, have unshirkable responsibilities for climate change and should fulfill their major obligations. They should fully meet emissions reduction targets set by the Kyoto Protocol and continue to take the lead in cutting emissions after 2012, when the protocol expires. **For developing countries, as their** accumulative **emissions** in the past and per capita emissions **are low, their primary task** at present **remains** economic **growth and poverty eradication. To this end, developing countries will have** a **growing demand for energy, a basic prerequisite for** their **development.**

Poverty and growth outweigh the environment, and growth solves the aff.

**Spencer 4** writes[[45]](#footnote-45)

I recall that when I was growing up in the 1960s, things were getting pretty dirty and smelly. Trash lined the roads. You could barely breathe driving through the Gary, Ind., industrial complex. One polluted river - in Cleveland - actually caught fire, and Lake Erie was virtually dead. The people wanted a cleaner environment, and they got it. The Clean Air Act of 1970 helped to accomplish this. Today - according to the EPA's latest assessment in 2003 - our environment continues to get cleaner, a trend that is expected to continue. Of course, everyone would like a perfectly clean environment: no air or water pollution, cars that get 500 m.p.g., and untouched rain forests. But the reality is that, **with** close to **6 billion people on the earth**, it's impossible for the Earth to not notice that we are here. Simply put, **some** amount of **pollution is unavoidable**. This is true of animals besides humans, and explains why, when hiking along that pristine, clear mountain stream, you should probably resist the urge to drink out of it. **Industrialization and its** resultant **economy of scale are necessary** ingredients **for a healthy economy**. But since industry concentrates productivity in one spot, it also concentrates pollution in that same spot, making it much more noticeable. So, for a price, usually in the form of more expensive goods and services, the most dangerous and obnoxious kinds of pollution can be greatly reduced or even eliminated. And governmental regulation helps accomplish this, expressing the desire of the people for a cleaner environment through laws. But how clean is clean enough? **Cleanliness is not free**. It turns out that it is **the wealthy countries** of the world that **can afford to control their pollution. The poorest countries typically have the worst environmental records**. Where free markets and limited governmental regulation exist, prosperity allows people the luxury of environmentalism. In countries where the government does not allow its economy to grow through free market forces, the environment suffers. The former Soviet Union and eastern European countries before the fall of communism are good examples of this. As an environmental bonus, the **wealthiest countries have the lowest population growth** rates. With our environment cleaner than it's been in many decades, the relatively small **environmental gains of** increasingly stringent **regulations must be weighed against their cost**, **to the economy** in general, **and** especially to **the poor**. This is the basic thesis of John Stossel's excellent ABC News special Are We Scaring Ourselves to Death? He discovered that **the greatest threat to human health isn't some environmental concern** like mercury pollution, or asbestos - **but poverty**. And **wealth that we put into the** latest **environment**al scare **might be better spent** where it will do more good. I'll put it bluntly: How many poor children's lives are you willing to sacrifice to make sure the water you drink or the air you breathe is a little bit cleaner? **Africa is** currently **bearing the brunt of environmentalist pressure, with** literally **millions** of people being either **killed** or maimed by **malaria,** a **preventable** disease **with a small amount of pesticide put safely on doorposts** twice a year. **But because of green pressure, some countries have** trade **laws that restrict trade with countries that use certain pesticides**. Read Paul Driessen's book Eco-Imperialism: Green Power, Black Death and ask yourself whether maybe we have gone too far with environmentalism. My wish for Americans this Earth Day is for people to become better informed about the economic, and therefore human, cost of unnecessary environmental regulation. If after reading this you still think we must do a lot more to clean up the environment - well, I'll bet you are well-fed, and have a roof over your head.

**Growth Solves Environment**

Economic growth turns the environment and EP kills growth.

**Adler 1** writes[[46]](#footnote-46)

[Brackets in original.] **Economic progress is** absolutely **essential to environmental progress**. Environmental protection is a good, and like all goods it must be purchased. A healthy economy is necessary to finance environmental improvements. While many environmental activists perceive a conflict between economic growth and environmental progress, the opposite is true. Sewage treatment facilities and other environmental **improvements are not free**. Moreover, **a significant body of literature has found** a **correlation between economic improvements and** several measures of **environmental quality**. Not only are wealthy communities healthier than poor communities, but they also tend on average to be more concerned about upholding environmental values as well. Wealthier societies have both the means and the desire to address a wider array of environmental concerns. Economic **growth fuels tech**nological advance and generates the resources necessary **to** deploy new methods of **meet**ing **human needs efficiently** and effectively**. Thus, wealthier societies** tend to **provide for human needs in a more environmentally sound manner**. “Countries undergo an environmental transition as they become wealthier and reach a point at which they start getting cleaner.” This occurs first with particularly acute environmental concerns, such as access to safe drinking water and sanitation services. As affluence increases, so does the attention paid to conventional pollution concerns such as fecal coliform bacteria and urban air quality. In much the same way that wealthier societies become cleaner, “wealthier is healthier.” In other words, **as income increases, mortality and morbidity decline**. Conversely, “when national income falls, there is often a significant increase in mortality and a decline in health status. Expenditures on regulatory compliance are rarely wealth enhancing, and therefore increasing regulatory costs can reduce gains in public health. As Justice Stephen Breyer observed, “[a]t all times regulation imposes costs that mean less real income available to individuals for alternative expenditure[, which] itself has adverse health effects. Wealthier societies are not only cleaner and healthier; they are also more willing and able to devote resources to environmental concerns. Public support for environmental measures, both public and private, correlates with changes in personal income. In economic jargon, “[w]illingness to pay for environmental measures…is highly elastic with respect to income.” Thus, it should be no surprise that **donors to environmental groups tend to have above average** annual **incomes.** Members of the Sierra Club, for example, have an average household income more than double the US average. In the aggregate, **environmental regulation** can work against continuing environmental progress by diverting tens of billions of dollars, if not more, away from wealth-creating activity. Insofar as regulation **reduces** economic **growth by diverting investment and** human **energies** away **from productivity, it will retard environmental progress**. While **this** is true in the US, it **is especially true in the poorest** of **nations**. Therefore, environmental policy makers must always be conscious of the costs of environmental measures, as increased compliance costs can come at the expense of environmental improvement.

Growth solves air and water pollution.

**Bailey 2k** writes[[47]](#footnote-47)

Why has air quality improved so dramatically? Part of the answer lies in emissions targets set by federal, state, and local governments. But these need to be understood in the twin contexts of rising wealth and economic efficiency. As a Department of Interior analyst concluded after surveying emissions in 1999, "**Cleaner air is a direct consequence of better tech**nologies **and** the enormous and sustained **investments that only a rich nation could have sunk into developing**, installing, and operating these technologies." Today, American businesses, consumers, and government agencies spend about $40 billion annually on air pollution controls. It is now evident that **countries undergo** various **environmental transitions as they become wealthier**. Fortune's special "ecology" edition in February 1970 was far more prescient than the doomsters when it noted, "If pollution is the brother of affluence, concern about pollution is affluence's child." In 1992, a **World Bank** analysis **found that** concentrations of **particulates and sulfur dioxide peak at per capita incomes of $3,280 and $3,670**, respectively. **Once these** income **thresholds are crossed, societies start to purchase** increased environmental amenities such as **clean air and water. In the U.S., air quality has been improving rapidly** since before the first Earth Day--and before the federal Clean Air Act of 1970. In fact, ambient levels of particulates and sulfur dioxide have been declining ever since accurate records have been kept. Between 1960 and 1970, for instance, particulates declined by 25 percent; sulfur dioxide decreased by 35 percent between 1962 and 1970. More concretely, it takes 20 new cars to produce the same emissions that one car produced in the 1960s. **Similar trends can be found when it comes to water pollution**. The warning sign is gone from the Potomac and I can swim and fish in that river again. Lake Erie once again supports a $600 million fishing industry, and an upscale shopping and entertainment district now lines the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland. The EPA estimates that between 60 percent and 70 percent of lakes, rivers, and streams meet state quality goals. That's up from about 30 percent to 40 percent 30 years ago. **Since** 19**72, the U**nited **S**tates **has invested more than $540 billion in water pollution control** efforts, according to the Pacific Research Center. In 1972, only 85 million Americans were served by sewage treatment plants. Since then, some 14,000 municipal waste treatment plants have been built and 173 million Americans are served by them. **Similar** air and water quality **trends can be found in other developed countries** as well.

**Growth Turns Civil War**

Econ decline turns civil war.

**Ross 3** writes[[48]](#footnote-48)

This is a catastrophic record on economic grounds alone. But it also has implications for susceptibility of these states to civil war: **recent studies suggest that when** a country’s **growth** rate **turns negative, a civil war is more likely to break out. In** the **three years leading up to** the **war in the** Democratic Republic of **Congo**, for example, **GDP** growth **averaged –5**.56 **percent;** in the three years before the Congo Republic’s civil war, growth was -1.94 percent; **on the eve of Liberia’s civil war, growth averaged –1**.34 **percent.**

**RE Solves Poverty**

**Mexico Proves**

Empirics prove. Resource extraction solves poverty.

**Lopez-Feldman et al. 6** writes[[49]](#footnote-49)

The potential importance of natural resources for the livelihood of poor rural households has long been recognized but seldom quantified and analyzed. In this paper we examine distributional and poverty effects of natural resource extraction at the national, regional and community levels. To do this, **we use new data from a national** rural household **survey** and a community survey implemented in the Lacandona Rainforest (Selva Lacandona) **of Mexico**. First, we explore whether income from natural resource extraction affects poverty and inequality. Then we calculate the marginal impact of a change in the price of natural resources on inequality. Finally, using information from Frontera Corozal, a community in the Selva Lacandona, we evaluate the short-run poverty effects of changes in the price of a non-timber forest product (the xate palm), which is extracted from this and other threatened forest areas in Mexico and Guatemala. **Our findings highlight the importance of** income from natural **resource extraction in alleviating poverty** and income inequality in rural Mexico. Results show that **the number of poor individuals increases 4**.2**%** and inequality increases 2.4% **when natural resource income is not taken into consideration**. Inequality in the distribution of natural resource income is relatively high. Nevertheless, an unequally distributed income source may favor the poor. For example, welfare transfers are usually unequally distributed (most households do not receive them), but they are directed disproportionately at poor households. This is the case for natural resource income in all of our samples. A **10% increase in income from natural resources**, other things being equal, **reduces the Gini coefficient of total income inequality by 0.2%** in Mexico. In the South-Southeast region and in Frontera Corozal, a 10% increase in natural resource income reduces the Gini coefficient by 0.36% and 0.11%, respectively.

Mexico proves. Resource extraction solves poverty – decreases rural outmigration. **AUCC 12** writes[[50]](#footnote-50)

Poverty, in its various dimensions, has always been and remains at the centre of the development problematic. The aim and most general objective of the research network and team set up by the applicant and the collaborator is to examine this poverty-development problematic in the context of **Zacatecas** (**Mexico**), a state that over the years **has experienced** the most **dramatic** rate of **rural outmigration** in all of Mexico, **but** that **is now looking to** the industry of natural **resource extraction** (gold and silver mining) **as a development pathway out of poverty** for the rural population. The purpose of this examination and associated research is to generate better and more knowledge about the policy dynamics of two alternative development pathways out of poverty-migration and natural resource extraction (mining). In the absence of perceived alternatives **outmigration has been the traditional response to** the widespread and deepening **crisis in ag**ricultural **production** that has afflicted the state. **But** this response is not a solution to the crisis and the endemic poverty associated with it, in that **migration robs the economy of its most productive members**; and despite ideas and arguments to the contrary, the remittances of the **income earned by** these **migrant workers** also **do not constitute a** development **pathway out of poverty. A more promising pathway**, we suggest, **is** constituted by a recent revival of a traditional **industry based on an abundant supply of** silver, gold and other strategic **minerals.** Traditionally, a national or local development strategy based on natural resource extraction has been subject to what economists have described as a ‘resource curse’, which is that the benefits of the extracted wealth of natural resources has tended to disproportionately benefit foreign investors and the mining companies at the expense of local communities and the country as a whole; indeed, more often than not natural resource or mineral extraction has had few development spread effects, with the economic, with social and environmental costs far exceeding its benefits for the owners of the wealth. However, there are reasons to believe that conditions today have significantly improved and that under the new regulatory regime adopted by many resource-rich commodity exporting countries, the development potential of mining and natural resource extraction could be very positive both for the local rural communities and the country as a whole. Indeed, this is the rationale behind the Canadian government’s recent announcement of its decision to launch development projects in partnership with mining firms. It is also the rationale of our proposal to examine the policy dynamics and development implications of Canadian mining in Zacatecas, and to do on the basis of collaborative research and an academic alliance between two universities that share a commitment to the search for development pathways out of rural poverty and the design of appropriate public policy-policies for sustainable development.

**Fossil Fuels Good**

Fossil fuels solve poverty and the environment long-term.

**Lomborg 13** writes[[51]](#footnote-51)

PRAGUE — THERE’S a lot of hand-wringing about our warming planet, but billions of people face a more immediate problem: They are desperately poor, and many cook and heat their homes using open fires or leaky stoves that burn dirty fuels like wood, dung, crop waste and coal. About 3.5 million of them die prematurely each year as a result of breathing the polluted air inside their homes — about 200,000 more than the number who die prematurely each year from breathing polluted air outside, according to a study by the World Health Organization. There’s no question that burning fossil fuels is leading to a warmer climate and that addressing this problem is important. But doing so is a question of timing and priority. **For many parts of the world, fossil fuels** are still vital and will be for the next few decades, because they **are the only means to lift people out of** the smoke and darkness of **energy poverty. More than 1**.2 **billion people** around the world **have no access to electricity**, according to the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook for 2012. **Most of them live in** sub-Saharan **Africa and in Asia**. That is nearly four times the number of people who live in the United States. In sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, excluding South Africa, the entire electricity-generating capacity available is only 28 gigawatts — equivalent to Arizona’s — for 860 million people. About 6.5 million people live in Arizona. Even more people — an estimated three billion — still cook and heat their homes using open fires and leaky stoves, according to the energy agency. More efficient stoves could help. And solar panels could provide LED lights and power to charge cellphones. But let’s face it. What **those living in energy poverty need** are **reliable, low-cost fossil fuels**, at least **until we can make a global transition to** a **greener** energy future. This is not just about powering stoves and refrigerators to improve billions of lives but about powering agriculture and industry that will improve lives. Over the last 30 years, **China moved** an estimated **680 million people out of poverty by giving them access to** modern **energy, mostly powered by coal**. Yes, **this has resulted in** terrible air **pollution and** a huge increase in greenhouse gas **emissions. But it is a trade-off many developing countries would gratefully choose. As China becomes wealthier, it will** most likely **begin to cut its** air **pollution problem** through regulation, **just as the rich world did in the 20th century**. But, admittedly, cutting carbon-dioxide emissions will be much harder because these emissions are a byproduct of the cheap energy that makes the world go around.

**Growth I/L**

Development in developing countries is key to solve poverty.

**World Bank 11** writes[[52]](#footnote-52)

World Bank Group: Working to End Extreme Poverty and Hunger For more than 60 years, the World Bank Group has partnered with governments worldwide, reducing poverty by providing financial and technical help. **Since 2000, developing countries have cut extreme poverty in half**, achieving MDG 1 five years ahead of schedule. **That milestone was not met in much of Africa and South Asia, however. More than a billion people worldwide still live in extreme poverty**, and many more experience hunger and are vulnerable to environmental or price shocks. The Bank Group is working with the international community to end extreme poverty in a generation and boost incomes for the bottom 40 percent in each country. With food security a vital part of this effort, the Bank Group is boosting agriculture financing to $8-10 billion a year and is working in multiple ways to build agricultural productivity and resilience to climate change. Peanuts are one of Mali’s primary exports. Peanuts are one of Mali’s primary exports. We can reduce poverty and hunger by: investing in agriculture creating jobs expanding social safety nets expanding nutrition programs that target children under 2 years of age universalizing education promoting gender equality protecting vulnerable countries during crises Making Strides in Eradicating Poverty and Hunger **A meaningful path out of poverty requires a strong economy that produces jobs and good wages**; a government that can provide schools, hospitals, roads, and energy; and healthy, well-nourished children who are the future human capital that will fuel economic growth. Between 2003 and 2013, the Bank Group supported basic nutrition services for more than 211 million pregnant women, nursing mothers, adolescent girls, and children under 5. The Bank Group’s fund for the poorest countries –the International Development Association (IDA) – committed a record $16.3 billion in fiscal year 2013 to promote economic growth, increase shared prosperity, and fight extreme poverty.

**Poverty Turns Civil War**

Poverty turns civil war. **Ross 3** writes[[53]](#footnote-53)

Again, this pattern is intrinsically worrisome, but it also has consequences for a state’s susceptibility to violent conflict. **The greater a country’s poverty, the more likely it is to face** a **civil war**.9 Not surprisingly, **people are more likely to rise up against their government** when their economic predicament is bad and getting worse. **Rebel groups find it easier to recruit new members** when there is widespread poverty and unemployment, **since it makes** the prospect of **combat and looting seem more attractive by comparison.**

**Structural Violence/Turns EP**

Poverty causes structural violence which risks extinction and turns sustainable development.

**Szentes 8** writes[[54]](#footnote-54)

It’ s a common place that **human society can survive and develop only in** a **lasting real peace**. Without peace countries cannot develop. Although since 1945 there has been no world war, but --numerous local wars took place, --**terror**ism **has spread** all over the world, undermining security even in the most developed and powerful countries, --**arms race and militarisation have** not ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, but **escalated** and continued**, extending** also **to w**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction and misusing enormous resources badly needed for development, --many **“invisible wars” are suffered by the poor** and oppressed people, manifested in mass misery, poverty, unemployment, homelessness, starvation and malnutrition, epidemics and poor health conditions, exploitation and oppression, racial and other discrimination, physical terror, organised injustice, disguised forms of violence, the denial or regular infringement of the democratic rights of citizens, women, youth, ethnic or religious minorities, etc., **and** last but not least, in the degradation of human environment, which means that --**the “war against Nature”, i.e.** the disturbance of ecological balance, **wasteful management of** natural **resources**, and large-scale pollution of our environment, is still going on, causing also losses and fatal dangers for human life. **Behind** global terrorism and **“invisible wars” we find striking** international and intrasociety **inequities and distorted development patterns , which tend to generate social as well as international tensions,** thus **paving the way for** unrest and **“visible” wars**. It is a commonplace now that peace is not merely the absence of war. The prerequisites of a lasting peace between and within societies involve not only - though, of course, necessarily - demilitarisation, but also a systematic and gradual elimination of the roots of violence, of the causes of “invisible wars”, of the structural and institutional bases of large-scale international and intra-society inequalities, exploitation and oppression. Peace requires a process of social and national emancipation, a progressive, democratic transformation of societies and the world bringing about equal rights and opportunities for all people, sovereign participation and mutually advantageous co-operation among nations. It further requires a pluralistic democracy on global level with an appropriate system of proportional representation of the world society, articulation of diverse interests and their peaceful reconciliation, by non-violent conflict management, and thus also a global governance with a really global institutional system. Under the contemporary conditions of accelerating globalisation and deepening global interdependencies in our world, peace is indivisible in both time and space. It cannot exist if reduced to a period only after or before war, and cannot be safeguarded in one part of the world when some others suffer visible or invisible wars. Thus, peace requires, indeed, a new, demilitarised and democratic world order, which can provide equal opportunities for sustainable development. **“Sustainability of development”** (both on national and world level) **is often interpreted as an issue of environmental protection only and reduced to** the **need for preserving** the ecological balance and delivering the next generations not a destroyed Nature with overexhausted **resources** and polluted environment. **However, no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the deep international development gap and** intra-society **inequalities are substantially reduced**. Owing to global interdependencies there may exist hardly any “zero-sum-games”, in which one can gain at the expense of others, but, instead, the “negative-sum-games” tend to predominate, in which everybody must suffer, later or sooner, directly or indirectly, losses. Therefore, **the actual question is not** about **“sustainability of development” but** rather about the **“sustainability of human life”, i.e. survival of mankind – because of ecological imbalance and** globalised **terror**ism. When Professor Louk de la Rive Box was the president of EADI, one day we had an exchange of views on the state and future of development studies. We agreed that development studies are not any more restricted to the case of underdeveloped countries, as the developed ones (as well as the former “socialist” countries) are also facing development problems, such as those of structural and institutional (and even system-) transformation, requirements of changes in development patterns, and concerns about natural environment. While all these are true, today I would dare say that besides (or even instead of) “development studies” we must speak about and make “survival studies”. While the monetary, financial, and debt crises are cyclical, we live in an almost permanent crisis of the world society, which is multidimensional in nature, involving not only economic but also socio-psychological, behavioural, cultural and political aspects. The narrow-minded, election-oriented, selfish behaviour motivated by thirst for power and wealth, which still characterise the political leadership almost all over the world, paves the way for the final, last catastrophe. One cannot doubt, of course, that great many positive historical changes have also taken place in the world in the last century. Such as decolonisation, transformation of socio-economic systems, democratisation of political life in some former fascist or authoritarian states, institutionalisation of welfare policies in several countries, rise of international organisations and new forums for negotiations, conflict management and cooperation, institutionalisation of international assistance programmes by multilateral agencies, codification of human rights, and rights of sovereignty and democracy also on international level, collapse of the militarised Soviet bloc and system-change3 in the countries concerned, the end of cold war, etc., to mention only a few. Nevertheless, the crisis of the world society has extended and deepened, approaching to a point of bifurcation that necessarily puts an end to the present tendencies, either by the final catastrophe or a common solution. **Under** the circumstances provided by rapidly **progressing science and technological revolutions,** human **society cannot survive unless** such **profound** intra-society and international **inequalities** prevailing today **are** soon **eliminated**. Like a single spacecraft, the Earth can no longer afford to have a 'crew' divided into two parts: the rich, privileged, wellfed, well-educated, on the one hand, and the poor, deprived, starving, sick and uneducated, on the other. Dangerous 'zero-sum-games' (which mostly prove to be “negative-sum-games”) can hardly be played any more by visible or invisible wars in the world society. Because of global interdependencies, the apparent winner becomes also a loser. The real choice for the world society is between negative- and positive-sum-games: i.e. between, on the one hand, continuation of visible and “invisible wars”, as long as this is possible at all, and, on the other, transformation of the world order by demilitarisation and democratization. No ideological or terminological camouflage can conceal this real dilemma any more, which is to be faced not in the distant future, by the next generations, but in the coming years, because of global terrorism soon having nuclear and other mass destructive weapons, and also due to irreversible changes in natural environment

**Structural Violence (Gilligan 96)**

Poverty causes structural violence which causes and outweighs extinction.

**Gilligan 96** writes[[55]](#footnote-55)

The **14 to 18 million deaths a year caused by structural violence compare with about 100,000 deaths per year from armed conflict. Comparing this frequency of deaths from structural violence to** the frequency of those caused by major military and political violence, such as World War II (an estimated 49 million military and civilian deaths, including those by genocide-or about eight million per year, 1939-1945), the Indonesian massacre of 1965-66 (perhaps 575,000) deaths), the Vietnam war (possibly two million, 1954-1973), and **even a hypothetical nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R** . (232 million), it was clear that **even war cannot begin to compare with structural violence**, which continues year after year. In other words, every fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. **This is**, in effect. **the equivalent of an ongoing, unending**~ in fact **accelerating,** thermo**nuclear war**, or genocide, **perpetrated on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world. Structural violence is also the main cause of** behavioral violence on a socially and epidemiologically significant scale (from homicide and suicide to **war and genocide**). The question as to which of the two forms of violence-structural or behavioral-is more important, dangerous, or lethal is moot, for they are inextricably related to each other, as cause to effect.

1. EcoVitality (non-profit environmental group). “Causes of Environmental Law Failures.” No date. http://ecovitality.org/badlaw.htm [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Simon Reid-Henry (lecturer in the School of Geography at Queen Mary, University of London and a senior fellow at the Peace Research Institute, Oslo). “Do resource extraction and the legacy of colonialism keep poor countries poor?” The Guardian. October 22nd, 2012. <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2012/oct/22/resource-extraction-colonialism-legacy-poor-countries> [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Robert Wenzel (economist and writer). “The ‘Blood Diamond’ Hoax, Liberia as a Parlor Game and You.” Economic Policy Journal. August 10th, 2010. http://www.economicpolicyjournal.com/2010/08/blood-diamond-hoax-liberia-as-parlor.html [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. David Friedman (writer, international consultant, and fellow in the MIT Japan program). “The ‘environmental racism’ hoax.” American Enterprise Institute. 1998. http://yyy.rsmas.miami.edu/groups/ambient/teacher/env\_justice/module%20segments/ib%20The%20environmental%20racism%20hoax.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. David Friedman (writer, international consultant, and fellow in the MIT Japan program). “The ‘environmental racism’ hoax.” American Enterprise Institute. 1998. http://yyy.rsmas.miami.edu/groups/ambient/teacher/env\_justice/module%20segments/ib%20The%20environmental%20racism%20hoax.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Amanda Griscom Little (staff writer). “Not in Whose Backyard?” New York Times. September 2nd, 2007. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/02/magazine/02wwln-essay-t.html?\_r=0 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. EcoVitality (non-profit environmental group). “Causes of Environmental Law Failures.” 1999. http://ecovitality.org/badlaw.htm [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Kirk Smith (Professor of Environmental Health Sciences, University of California, Berkeley). “Environmental health – for the rich or for all?” WHO Bulletin. 2000. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. EcoVitality (non-profit environmental group). “Causes of Environmental Law Failures.” 1999. http://ecovitality.org/badlaw.htm [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Cristina Bodea, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Michigan State University, East Lansing This research was supported by the Economic Policy and Debt Department, the World Bank, through a grant from the Governance Partnership Facility (GPF). I have received helpful comments from Sona Varma, Philip Keefer, Michael Colaresi, Corwin Smidt and the Junior Faculty group at MSU’s Political Science Department. I thank James Fearon for sharing his data. Chunho Park contributed with research assistance., “Natural resources, weak states and civil war: Can rents stabilize coup prone regimes?”, Source- World Bank, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/9350/WPS6071.pdf?sequence=1, May 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Michael Ross (Professor of Political Science at UCLA). “Natural Resources and Civil War: An Overview.” Submitted for review to World Bank Research Observer. August 15th, 2003. http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/conflict/ross\_2003.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Tugba Gunes, cites a study by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. “Natural Resources and Civil War.” Popular Social Science. December 20th, 2012. http://www.popularsocialscience.com/2012/12/20/natural-resources-and-civil-war/ [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Distinguished Fellow, Fullbright Foundation (Gregg Easterbrook, A Moment on Earth, 1995, pg 25 [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Richard J. Lazarus (prof of law at Georgetown University Law Center). “Human Nature, the Laws of Nature, and the Nature of Environmental Law” 24 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 231-261, January 2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Gregg Easterbrook, senior fellow at The New Republic, July 2003, Wired, “We’re All Gonna Die!” http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=2&topic=&topic\_set= [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Science Daily, reprinted from materials provided by American Institute of Biological Sciences, September 1, 2010, "Human Well-Being Is Improving Even as Ecosystem Services Decline: Why?", http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/09/100901072908.htm [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. William Grey, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Queensland, 1993 (“Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology,” Australiasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 71, Number 4, Available Online at http://www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/anthropocentrism.html, Accessed 07-27-2011 [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Kelly A., Associate Professor and Chair of philosophy at Grand valley state Pragmatism and Environmental Thought, Environmental Pragmatism edited by Andrew Light and Eric Katz, [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Baum, PhD @ Penn State University, 2009, “Cost benefit analysis of space exploration: Some ethical considerations,” Space Policy, Vol. 25 [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada. “Resource extraction as a development pathway: Economic and social policies for poverty reduction and rural development.” Project Overview, start date: November 2012. http://www.aucc.ca/research-exchange-projects/resource-extraction-as-a-development-pathway-economic-and-social-policies-for-poverty-reduction-and-rural-development/ [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Daniel Cohanpour (junior Government and Information Science major from Long Island, specializing in International Development). “Africa: New Report On Africa Shows Economic Growth and Natural Resource Potential.” AllAfrica.com. October 16th, 2013. http://allafrica.com/stories/201310170400.html [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Noel Ngangira (Harare, Zimbabwe based consultant and investment advisor focused on the resource sector). “Myth of Africa’s ‘resource curse’.” New Zimbabwe. February 18th, 2011. http://www.newzimbabwe.com/opinion-4503-Myth%20of%20Africa%E2%80%99s%20%E2%80%98resource%20curse%E2%80%99/opinion.aspx [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Gavin Wright (William Robertson Coe Professor of American Economic History at Stanford

    University) and Jesse Czelusta (graduate student in economics at Stanford). “The Myth of the Resource Curse.” Challenge, vol. 47, no. 2. March-April 2004. http://cafehayek.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/The-Myth-of-the-Resource-Curse.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Michael Levi (David M. Rubenstein senior fellow for energy and the environment at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of the forthcoming book The Power Surge: Energy, Opportunity, and the Battle for America's Future). “The Other Resource Curse.” Foreign Policy Magazine. February 7, 2013 [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Gavin Wright (William Robertson Coe Professor of American Economic History at Stanford

    University) and Jesse Czelusta (graduate student in economics at Stanford). “The Myth of the Resource Curse.” Challenge, vol. 47, no. 2. March-April 2004. http://cafehayek.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/The-Myth-of-the-Resource-Curse.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Kate Douglas (staff writer). “How resource extraction is developing Africa’s hospitality industry.” March 7th, 2014. http://www.howwemadeitinafrica.com/how-resource-extraction-is-developing-africas-hospitality-industry/36384/ [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Jewellord Nem Singh and France Bourgouin (editors of this book). “Resource Governance and Developmental States in the Global South.” Palgrave Macmillan. November 2013. <http://www.palgrave.com/PDFs/9781137286789.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Michael Alexeev (Department of Economics at Indiana University) and Robert Conrad (Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy and Department of Economics, Duke University). “The Elusive Curse of Oil.” February 2008. http://mypage.iu.edu/~malexeev/alexeev\_conrad\_restat\_feb\_08.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Michael Alexeev (Department of Economics at Indiana University) and Robert Conrad (Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy and Department of Economics, Duke University). “The Elusive Curse of Oil.” February 2008. http://mypage.iu.edu/~malexeev/alexeev\_conrad\_restat\_feb\_08.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. EcoVitality (non-profit environmental group). “Causes of Environmental Law Failures.” 1999. http://ecovitality.org/badlaw.htm [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Joshua Kurlantzick (Senior Fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations). “Obama Hasn’t Been Developing Democracies’ Best Friend.” Bloomberg Businessweek. March 10th, 2014. http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-03-10/obama-hasnt-been-developing-democracies-best-friend [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Terry L. Anderson (executive director of the Property and Environment Research Center, a John and Jean de Nault senior fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, and adjunct professor at the Stanford Graduate School of Business) and Laura Huggins (research fellow and director of outreach with PERC as well as a research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University). “The Property Rights Path to Sustainable Development.” Property and Environment Research Center. October 23rd, 2003. http://perc.org/articles/property-rights-path-sustainable-development [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Gavin Wright (William Robertson Coe Professor of American Economic History at Stanford

    University) and Jesse Czelusta (graduate student in economics at Stanford). “The Myth of the Resource Curse.” Challenge, vol. 47, no. 2. March-April 2004. http://cafehayek.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/The-Myth-of-the-Resource-Curse.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Gavin Wright (William Robertson Coe Professor of American Economic History at Stanford

    University) and Jesse Czelusta (graduate student in economics at Stanford). “The Myth of the Resource Curse.” Challenge, vol. 47, no. 2. March-April 2004. http://cafehayek.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/The-Myth-of-the-Resource-Curse.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Gavin Wright (William Robertson Coe Professor of American Economic History at Stanford

    University) and Jesse Czelusta (graduate student in economics at Stanford). “The Myth of the Resource Curse.” Challenge, vol. 47, no. 2. March-April 2004. http://cafehayek.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/The-Myth-of-the-Resource-Curse.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Gavin Wright (William Robertson Coe Professor of American Economic History at Stanford

    University) and Jesse Czelusta (graduate student in economics at Stanford). “The Myth of the Resource Curse.” Challenge, vol. 47, no. 2. March-April 2004. http://cafehayek.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/The-Myth-of-the-Resource-Curse.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Gavin Wright (William Robertson Coe Professor of American Economic History at Stanford

    University) and Jesse Czelusta (graduate student in economics at Stanford). “The Myth of the Resource Curse.” Challenge, vol. 47, no. 2. March-April 2004. http://cafehayek.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/The-Myth-of-the-Resource-Curse.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Michael Alexeev (Department of Economics at Indiana University) and Robert Conrad (Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy and Department of Economics, Duke University). “The Elusive Curse of Oil.” February 2008. http://mypage.iu.edu/~malexeev/alexeev\_conrad\_restat\_feb\_08.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Michael Alexeev (Department of Economics at Indiana University) and Robert Conrad (Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy and Department of Economics, Duke University). “The Elusive Curse of Oil.” February 2008. http://mypage.iu.edu/~malexeev/alexeev\_conrad\_restat\_feb\_08.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Michael Alexeev (Department of Economics at Indiana University) and Robert Conrad (Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy and Department of Economics, Duke University). “The Elusive Curse of Oil.” February 2008. http://mypage.iu.edu/~malexeev/alexeev\_conrad\_restat\_feb\_08.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Michael Alexeev (Department of Economics at Indiana University) and Robert Conrad (Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy and Department of Economics, Duke University). “The Elusive Curse of Oil.” February 2008. http://mypage.iu.edu/~malexeev/alexeev\_conrad\_restat\_feb\_08.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Barrie McKenna (Globe and Mail correspondent and columnist in Washington). “Oil wealth: Proving to be more purse than curse.” July 15th, 2008. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinions/columnists/Barrie+McKennaBio.html [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Daryl Reed (Assistant Professor in the Division of Social Science and Co-ordinator of the Business & Society Program at York University). “Resource Extraction Industries in Developing Countries.” Journal of Business Ethics. 2002. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Xinhua News. “Common but differentiated responsibilities – basis for tackling climate change.” Cited by the China Department of Climate Change. December 5th, 2007. <http://en.ccchina.gov.cn/Detail.aspx?newsId=35178&TId=97> [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Roy Spencer (research scientist at the University of Alabama in Huntsville). “A day for the Earth: Hidden costs of environmentalism are getting too much to bear.” April 22nd, 2004. http://articles.philly.com/2004-04-22/news/25364889\_1\_polluted-river-environmental-bonus-industrialization [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Jonathan Adler (professor of law at Case Western Reserve). “Free and Green: A New Approach to Environmental Protection.” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Vol. 24, No. 2, Spring 2001. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=262279 [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Ronald Bailey (award-winning science correspondent for *Reason* magazine and Reason.com). “Earth Day, Then and Now.” Reason. May 2000. http://reason.com/archives/2000/05/01/earth-day-then-and-now [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Michael Ross (Professor of Political Science at UCLA). “Natural Resources and Civil War: An Overview.” Submitted for review to World Bank Research Observer. August 15th, 2003. http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/conflict/ross\_2003.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Alejandro Lopez-Feldman, Jorge Mora, and J. Edward Taylor. “Does Natural Resource Extraction Mitigate Poverty and Inequality? Evidence from Rural Mexico and a Lacandona Rainforest Community.” Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, UC Davis. 2006. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada. “Resource extraction as a development pathway: Economic and social policies for poverty reduction and rural development.” Project Overview, start date: November 2012. http://www.aucc.ca/research-exchange-projects/resource-extraction-as-a-development-pathway-economic-and-social-policies-for-poverty-reduction-and-rural-development/ [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Bjorn Lomborg (director of the Copenhagen Consensus Center, a nonprofit group focused on cost-effective solutions to global problems, and the author of “The Skeptical Environmentalist.”). “The Poor Need Cheap Fossil Fuels.” The New York Times. December 3rd, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/04/opinion/the-poor-need-cheap-fossil-fuels.html?\_r=1& [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. World Bank (international financial institution that provides loans to developing countries for capital programs). “Goal 1: Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger by 2015.” Millenium Development Goals. 2011. <http://www.worldbank.org/mdgs/poverty_hunger.html> [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Michael Ross (Professor of Political Science at UCLA). “Natural Resources and Civil War: An Overview.” Submitted for review to World Bank Research Observer. August 15th, 2003. http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/conflict/ross\_2003.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Tamás Szentes (Professor Emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest). “Globalisation and prospects of the world society.” April 22nd, 2008. http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/Documents/Events/exco/Glob.\_\_\_prospects\_-\_jav..pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. James Gilligan (Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical and Director of the Center for the Study of Violence). “Violence: Our Deadly Epidemic and Its Causes,” p191-196 [↑](#footnote-ref-55)